Shytkov concludes that the Soviet delegation cannot back down from its demands for the parties in Korea to support the Moscow decision. A reversal of this position, Shtykov writes, would lead to the domination of US-backed, right-wing parties to take control over the Provisional Government of Korea.

Molotov blames the Americans for the failure of the US-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea and rejects the latest proposals put forth by Robert A. Lovett.

V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case of opposing proposals from the US, the Soviets should oppose and abstain rather than voting against them.

Vyshinsky clarifies that in case there is a decision to form a commission in Korea, it is not advisable for the US and the Soviets to take part. Vyshinsky requests for an answer on this issue.

Vyshinsky is instructed that, because the Korean issue is already on the UNSC agenda, it should remain there. Vyshinsky should stake out a position that both American and Soviet troops withdraw simultaneously, allowing the Koreans to develop a unified government. Elected representatives from both Koreas should be invited to discussions. A time span for the troop withdrawals must be set. The draft includes some scrawled recommendations from Stalin.

V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee.

Molotov writes that Vyshinsky must insist on the Koreans being invited to any discussion on removing foreign troops from Korea. If opposition to such participation holds, the Soviets should abstain from voting on the matter out of principle.

Molotov relates how the Americans have rejected the Soviet position toward establishing a temporary all Korean assembly. While there is some overlap between both positions, this issue has now been exacerbated by Marshall's move to decide it in the UNGA. The Soviets should respond to this move by reiterating their commitment to a self-determined form of government for Korea, which requires the Soviets and Americans to withdraw their troops.

Molotov reports his answers to several questions from Vyshinsky: he advises not to be so contentious with Marshall on private questions. On the Korean issues, Vyshinsky should remind the Americans about the terms of the December agreements calling for a united, democratic Korea and that Marshall's new proposals at the UN constitute a violation of these agreements. He approves Vyshinsky's position on the veto and the peace and security committee.

This document is a report on the Moscow Decision. It includes a 27 page report, a list of questions for the consultation with the parties, a section about the procedure of the consultation with the parties and social organizations, and a report on the work of factories in north Korea.