President Rhee praises South Vietnam's anti-communist exhibit and expresses his concern about the limitations of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

Kim Gu (Kim Koo) and the Chinese Nationalist Minister Liu Yuwan discuss Kim's participation in the South Korean government, his attendance at a conference in Pyongyang, and the possibility of a Russian-led attack on southern Korea.

On the flight from Pyongyang to Moscow, Kim Il Sung, Kim Chang-man, and A.M. Puzanov discuss the domestic situation of the DPRK and the situation in the South, including the uprising of the South Korean population against the dictatorship of Syngman Rhee.

In this proposed joint statement, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles discuss the terms for the joint security pact between the ROK and the US.

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

Shtykov passes on a memorandum to Vyshinsky written by Syngman Rhee to Dr. Robert T. Oliver.

In early August of 1950, delegates from the United States and the Republic of Korea met to discuss the logistics for the forthcoming conferences centered on the creation of a strong US-ROK mutual defense treaty. The delegates also propose who can and should be present. While both sides agree that North Korea and China should be included, President Rhee advocates that due to India’s Prime Minister’s “pro-communist views,” India should not be invited.

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

President Rhee writes to General Coulter to address the issue of prisoners of war. After stating that releasing POWs would “demoralize” Korean soldiers, Rhee expresses his concern for POWs forced to fight in the North’s side. Rhee states that “democratic-accepting” POWs can be released only after they pass a series of tests proving them to be anti-communist. Once released, these POWs can “carry their stories of fair treatment under a democratic United Nations.”

Nam Il, minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, sends letter to Sir Leslie Munro and Dag Hammarskjold to protest against UN General Assembly meeting which adopted an resolution to accept only South Korea into UN and denounces President Rhee of South Korea.