A report from Roberto de Oliveira Campos on how certain actions and diplomatic moves during the Cuban crisis have served to inflame international tensions on both sides.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells Brazilian officials about letters that have been sent between Kennedy and Khrushchev discussing missile bases in both Cuba and Turkey.

Campos sends an attached memorandum of analysis of the developments of the Cuban crisis, elaborated by the Political Sector of the Embassy. It discusses Soviet motivation, American actions, Soviet reactions, etc.

Campos discusses agreements that are being made between Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding the immediate dismantling of the missile bases in Cuba, international inspections of Cuba, and an abandonment of the demand for reciprocity in Turkey.

Campos discusses the brief alleviation in tensions between the United States and Soviet Union over the Cuban issue due to a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships.

Suggestion for a decision to internationalize the Cuban crisis would permit Cuba and the Soviet Union to "save face", diminishing the dangerous possibility of direct confrontation.