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Documents

April 4, 1963

Secret Telegram from Michałowski (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow)

Cable from Jerzy Michalowski in Warsaw to Boleslaw Jaszczuk in Moscow, informing him of information from the DRV ambassador to Poland. The ambassador relayed that the VWP does not think that the situation in South Vietnam is not yet favorable, but that once it is they will seek a solution to hostilities at an international peace conference. They state that they will continue to ascertain the true intentions of the United States, particularly the provision for a ceasefire.

February 13, 1963

Secret Telegram from Jaszczuk (Moscow) to Rapacki (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 2004]

Cable sent from a Polish representative in Moscow to Adam Rapacki in Warsaw about a meeting with Andrei Gromyko. He believes that the United States wishes to remove itself from the situation in Vietnam and concludes that a way to end the issue is getting closer.

February 1963

Soviet Memorandum on the Polish Peace Initiative on Vietnam

Soviet memorandum on the meeting between US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith and Polish officials Michalowski and Rapacki. Describes the meeting as a sign of US weariness of involvement in Southeast Asia. Asserts that a neutralized Vietnam could be useful to the socialist countries as well.

January 21, 1963

Galbraith’s Journal Entry Account of the Conversation with Rapacki and Michałowski in New Delhi

Record of conversation between John Kenneth Galbraith and Polish officials Jerzy Michałowski and Adam Rapacki. The Polish officials note that the American campaign is encouraging the North Vietnamese to look to the Chinese for help. Galbraith calls for a six month ceasefire as a sign of good faith.

January 24, 1966

Reception by Soviet Vice Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov for the General Director of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Cde. Jerzy Michalowski

Polish official, Jerzy Michalowski, discusses the Vietnamese situation after meeting with several high ranking officials there. He asserts that the Vietnamese misguided in their belief that the US is not willing to fight a broadened war. He also notes that, although Vietnamese allies recognize this, they discourage Vietnam from opening negotiations.