Presumably written by by Minister Israel Galili some time in 1970, this note discusses the publication of a story on Israel’s nuclear program in the New York Times. According to the note, the story mentions “the agreement we have with the President,” alluding to the 1969 Richard Nixon-Golda Meir deal on Israel’s nuclear status. The note further attempts to analyze which source within the Nixon administration had approached the paper and leaked assessments on Israel’s nuclear capabilities, underscoring the secrecy and the sensitivity surrounding the 1969 understanding.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Or Rabinowitz.

A memorandum that outlines several proposed courses of action the United States could take in order to stop the fighting in the region, restart negotiations, provide Israel reassurance, and does not reflect weakness towards Moscow.

A recap of a meeting in which Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Dobrynin discuss proposed formulations to negotiate a peace in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union's involvement in the UAR.

A conversation between Rogers and Kissinger, in which they discuss the meeting Kissinger previously had with Israeli Ambassador Rabin, and Kissinger's overall involvement in negotiations with Israel.

In a letter to the President, Rogers plans to take advantage of the favorable conditions created by the recent talks in New York by continuing bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, and participating in the renewed Four Power talks at the UN. The goal is to restart dialogue by mid-November.

Secretary Rogers speaks on the American role in peace in the Middle East, discussing previous talks with the Soviet Union and the United Nations, and outlining some of the key issues and the American position on them.

An assessment of the US Government's strategy in the Four Power Talks, specifically focusing on the goal of a comprehensive and final Arab-Israeli settlement, but acknowledging the immense difficulties of this given the positions of other international players.

Alarmed by the speed of the negotiations' progress, Secretary Rogers informs Ambassador Rush (and Henry Kissinger) that "an ad referendum agreement should not be reached at the present time."