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Documents

March 14, 1985

Memorandum of Conversation Between M. S. Gorbachev and General Secretary of the CC NDPA [National Democratic Party of Afghanistan], Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] B. Karmal.

Gorbachev and Chairman Karmal discuss the future of Afghanistan with less intervention from the Soviets.

May 21, 1982

Memorandum of Conversations between SED General Secretary Erich Honecker and Afghan Leader Babrak Karmal

Honecker and Karmal discuss East German support for Afghanistan, as well as threats against Afghanistan, especially from West German and Pakistan.

May 19, 1982

Memorandum of Conversations between SED General Secretary Erich Honecker and Afghan Leader Babrak Karmal

Karmal describes threats against the Soviet-backed Afghan government from Pakistan, Iran, the US, China, and Egypt.

September 12, 1978

Minutes from Conversation between Babrak Karmal and the Head of the Diplomatic Protocol Tucek

A summarized conversation between Babrak Karmal and the head of Diplomatic protocol regarding Karmal's request for political asylum in Czechoslovakia, following then end of his ambassadorship.

October 29, 1980

Soviet briefing on the talks between Brezhnev and B. Karmal in Moscow

This document reveals Babrak Karmal's positive views of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Karmal thanks Soviet leadership for substantial economic and political support, discussing the integration of Soviet economic reforms into the Afghan economy. Karmal states that the turmoil within Afghan political parties is almost solved, and is progressing towards unity.

August 30, 1981

Conversation with Afghan Leader Babrak Karmal Regarding the Situation in the 'Center' Zone

The General Consul is asked to approve an ultimatum which would allow Soviet forces to psychologically influence the rebels, and secondly, provide a way to warn the civilian population.

October 11, 1981

Conversation with Babrak Karmal

This document reveals the difficulty in distinguishing between rebels from the local population. The often coercive tactics of the Afghan military, which drew in individuals who would not join on their own, shows the difficulty in differentiating between rebels and local people.