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September 12, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Polish President Kwasniewski on Thursday, 12 September 1996, 9.30 hours

Kohl and Kwasniewski exchange thoughts on the state of Yeltsin's health. They agree that NATO must not pursue further steps in the enlargement process during the period of Yeltsin's illness after his  coronary bypass surgery. Finally, Kohl and Kwasniewski look into the timetable for NATO enlargement and the decision about its new members at the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid.

January 10, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the President of the Polish Republic, Mister Alexander Kwasniewski on 9 January 1996 at the Chancellor’s Office

Kohl refers to the Franco-German relationship as a role model for Germany’s relationship with Poland. Kwasniewski looks into Poland's domestic reform agenda stressing the importance of further expanding Poland's ties with NATO and the EC.

August 18, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 18 August 1995, 13.00 hours

Kohl and Major discuss the impact of the war in former Yugolavia on the Muslim world, the European Community and domestic U.S. policy. Both agree that there was a window of opportunity for a settlement before the winter.

July 20, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Yugoslavia Mediator Carl Bildt on 20 July 1995, 12.45 hours

Kohl and Bildt analyze the situation in former Yugoslavia and agree that the key NATO states were not willing to start  a war including hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Kohl says it was out the question for him to send German soldiers waging war in the Balkans.

September 9, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 7 September 1993

Kohl and Clinton discuss plans for NATO enlargement and the need to find a modus vivendi for an intermediate period as a way to balance Russia's engagement and the security interests of the Central and East European countries. Kohl has doubts over the feasibility of NATO enlargement but is willing to search for an intermediary solution.

May 7, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Christopher on Thursday, 6 May 1993

Kohl and Christopher discuss various scenarios in the search for peace in former Yugoslavia after the failure of the Vance/Owen plan. They debate whether Russia would perhaps accept a lifting of the arms embargo for the Muslims in Bosnia. Moreover, they discuss the state of Germany's domestic debate on out-of-area missions.

April 19, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 19 April, 13.45-13.55 hours

Kohl and Mitterrand discuss NATO's surprising decision to call for Turkish fighter aircraft in the mission to control Bosnia-Hercegovina's airspace. Both criticize the fact that the decision was taken by the military without political consultations. Both Kohl and and Mitterrand believe that "this was to wrong way to bring back Turkey to the Balkans."

March 19, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Thursday, 18 March 1993

Mitterrand gives a report on his recent meeting with Yeltsin emphasizing his support for the idea to have a multilateral Western summit meeting on financial aid for Russia prior to the 1993 Tokyo World Economic Summit as a way to show more support for Yeltsin. Kohl and Mitterrand discuss British and Japanese objections to this idea.

March 15, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 15 March 1993

Kohl and Mitterrand review the latter's meeting with Milosevic in Paris and the lack of results in the French dialogue with the Serbian leadership.

January 12, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, on Monday, 11 January 1993

Kohl and Ghali discuss Germany's international position after unification and the end of the Cold War. Kohl argues that many were surprised by the return of "old demons" in former Yugoslavia. He emphasizes the long-term objective of establish a new sort of European crisis management exluding a repetition of violent conflicts. This was the rational for his strong engagement in favor of the Maastricht Treaty.

Pagination