This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials on the topic of the embargo. They first discussed "the devilish British acts" around the world, especially in third world countries and the Arab countries. After the collapse of the British Empire, a new evil rose up and that is the United States. The Iraqi government decided to open all the sites to the UN inspectors who were selected by the UN General Secretary, who was pleased by the cooperation of Iraq for the first time. The reason for cooperation is that they are serious in having the embargo removing and proving to the world that they are innocent form the US and British pretexts. They talked about the countries that stood up beside Iraq at the UN, and the reasons for that are the four million tons of oil they gave to Russia and the two million tons they gave to France. The personnel present for this meeting were Saddam Hussein, Tariq 'Aziz, Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, the Foreigner Minister, "Izzat Al‐Duri and others.

This audio tape contained the following information from 00:00:07‐00:30:51 and 00:36:30‐00:56:15 displayed a meeting presided by Saddam Hussein and attended by several high ranking officials. The individuals talked about various issues coming after the 1st Gulf war and the 1991 Rebellion (Page of Treason and Treachery) such as: ‐Saddam Hussein stated, we must open the door of the hill on who ever deserved it (QC2‐ Translators Comments: he meant that the people who participated in the Rebellion or the people that deserted to Saudi Arabia or the Iran military or civilians) ‐Saddam asked the high ranking officials what was their opinion of people that were traitors to their country. They said that the traitors do not deserved forgiveness. Saddam said that the Republican guards should definitely not be forgiven and must be cleared.(Translators Comments QC2: His definition of cleared means to kill the people.) The clearing should be done no matter what the circumstance of the guard, and it should be done as soon as possible. ‐They talked about soldiers' discipline and training. ‐Saddam said on minute 39:19 that we struggled with the war, but we still went after the people who committed treason and cut their heads off. Also, we went after Israel and launched missiles to make them afraid forever. ‐They discussed the war between Iraq and Kuwait ‐They discussed Iraqi's attack on Kuwait. Saddam said that "Iraq can defend itself against Kuwait, and that Kuwait was a part of Iraq" ‐They talked about the umm Al‐ Ma'arik battle (The Mother of the Battle) ‐Saddam said that America could not attack Iraq by itself, so it collected thirty‐three countries to attack Iraq. ‐They described   American's attack and blockade against Iraq during the 1st Gulf War. ‐Saddam talked about the thirty‐three countries that used the latest weapon technology against Iraq.

This 93 minute audio file dated from 1992 contains a meeting chaired by the Iraqi President with the National Command of the Ba'th Party. They discussed the following topics: ‐Dispatching Iraqi Ba‐thists to Lebanon to support the Lebanese Ba'th party there. ‐ Edification of the people in southern and northern Iraq over the Party's principles. ‐The mechanism of defending the Iraqi sovereignty from the Kurdish, and Iranian enemies. ‐ Ba'th party affairs. ‐The role of the Iraqi media during the 1st Gulf war. ‐ Research centers and their impact on the development of the Iraqi individual. ‐The foreign propaganda and media attacks on the country. ‐ Reviving the national intellect. ‐ The Ba'th party ideology. ‐ controlling the treason acts in southern and northern Iraq. (Translator's Comment: from 01:15:59 till 01:33:37 are blank.)

Contains discussions between Saddam Hussein and the Council of Ministers regarding the Russian, Chinese and French positions regarding the sanctions on Iraq.

This file contains a National Command meeting presided over by Saddam Hussein. The attendees discuss the Baath party and its role in national development, the relationship between the Arab countries and Europe, and the international balance of power following the Cold War.

The text printed here, an English translation, is constituted by two excerpts from the famous yet controversial Arabic book Mustaqbal al-thaqafa fi Misr (1938) [The Future of Culture in Egypt],by Taha Hussein (1889-1973).

Born in a village in Upper Egypt and blind from the age of three, Hussein was first educated in his village school. He went on to the famous Azhar Islamic university in Cairo, to the newly founded Egyptian (Cairo) University, where he received a doctorate in 1914, and to Montpellier and the Sorbonne, which in 1917 awarded him another doctorate. For one thing, Hussein was a powerful educational institution builder, as Hussam Ahmed’s The Last Nahdawi: Taha Hussein and Institution Building in Egypt (2021) shows. Thus, he became a Cairo University professor in 1919, teaching Islamic history and Arabic literature, and he was the university’s Dean of Arts (1928, 1930-32 and 1936-39), a member and then president of the Arabic  Language Academy (1940-73), and Egypt’s Minister of Culture (1950-52). For another thing, Hussein was a supremely influential intellectual and a specialist of premodern and modern Arabic literature. Thus, from 1926 to 1967 he published the three-volume autobiographical novel Al-Ayyam [The Days], and in 1926 wrote Fi al-shi‘r al-jahili [On Pre-Islamic Poetry (2016)], which he revised as Fi al-adab al-jahili [On Pre-Islamic Literature (1927)] after traditionalists (unsuccessfully) took him to court. And although helping to introduce thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre to Arabs as the 1945-1948 editor of the journal al-Katib al-Misri, he belonged to the Arab Renaissance (nahda) literati who were from the 1940s accused by many younger intellectuals for not supporting committed art; in turn, he defended the necessity of not delimiting what art should be or do.

His 1938 text The Future of Culture in Egypt, excerpted here in a 1975 English translation, was very detailed—it included dozens of suggestions about how to improve Egypt’s educational system—and quite complex. On the one side, Hussein confidently took Europe to task in the main body of the work, and emphasized the need to thoroughly know one’s own culture and history. But on the other side, he saw European empires as still very powerful; thus, a lagging Egypt should embrace European concepts—an approach internalizing (self-interested) European Orientalist views, as Stephen Sheehi has argued in The Foundations of Modern Arab Identity (2004). In a sense, both of these two sides were framed by his work’s immediate historical context: the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Maximizing Egypt’s sovereignty and allowing it to become a League of Nations member in 1937, this treaty showed strength—but also continued weakness vis-à-vis Britain, whose troops remained in the Suez Canal zone. In the same vein, the introduction’s argument about Egypt’s geo-civilizational position accepted the discourse of a dominant Europe—only to make Egypt its geographical and historical pioneer by giving it great weight vis-à-vis Ancient Greece, which was conventionally seen as the cradle of European civilization.