The U.S. had hoped that an exchange of notes with Turkey on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would facilitate a technical level approach to the Turkish military on the “mechanics of Jupiter dismantling.” But with parliamentary approval of the notes delayed, and not likely to occur until later in the month, the U.S. needed to make an approach on dismantling so that it occurred in conjunction with the arrival of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. With dismantling scheduled to begin on April 15, the Department would like Hare’s advice on whether a technical approach could be made “without running unacceptable political risk.”

In this overview of the state of the Jupiter/Polaris negotiations and the next steps, the State Department instructs Ambassador Hare to lead the negotiations with Turkey and to inform U.S missions that McNamara’s letter to Andreotti on the Polaris and Sergeant deployments was in the works; that Turkish “conditions” were not clear; that the U.S. and the two countries had to formally notify NATO of the “modernization” program; that bilateral agreements with Ankara and Rome on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would need to be negotiated; that steps had to be taken to prepare Polaris submarines for missions in the Mediterranean by April 1; and that the U.S. needed “considerable lead time” to prepare for the removal of the Jupiters. The negotiation of Turkey’s conditions for the Jupiter removal should not hold up notifying NATO or cause delay of the U.S.-Italy arrangements. On the use of the naval base at Rota, Spain, for stationing Polaris submarines, several NATO governments had objected (because of the Franco dictatorship), and so far Madrid had rejected U.S. proposals.

The State Department remained concerned about reaching an agreement with Turkey in “principle without unfulfillable conditions of replacement Jupiter.” To move the negotiations along, this communication authorized Ambassador Hare to use as a “carrot” the Defense Department’s conditional approval of F-104 deliveries. It also advised him to avoid any “undue pressure” that could harm the negotiations.

The U.S. Departments of State and Defense analyze North Korea's claims relating to the Northern Limit Line and the origins of the NLL.

The U.S. Departments of Defense and State offer instructions about how to respond to the Northern Limit Line Dispute, including measures to restrain South Korea.

A few months after the Indian test, the intelligence community prepared an overall estimate of the global nuclear proliferation situation. Such an estimate had not been prepared since the 1960s, no doubt because of the White House’s lack of interest. This estimate, SNIE 4-1-74, has been released before but this version includes more information, mainly a section on the Indian nuclear program, which had previously been withheld. While finding it “likely” that India would launch a covert program to produce a few weapons, the analysts were not sure that such a decision had been made and suggested that Moscow or Washington might be able to persuade the Indians from moving in that direction.

Report to Kissinger from the Department of Defense on the legal and policy restrictions preventing U.S. assistance to France's ballistic missile program (mainly National Security Action Memorandum 294). The report also speculates on the specific technical problems the French may have and want assistance with.

Packard describes Foster and Blancard's meeting to discuss US assistance to the French ballistic missile program, stating that it "went exceedingly well." Blancard was appreciative of the US's assistance and understood the limitations that had been set. The next step would be a visit to France of top level personnel from US nuclear projects.

Report on a meeting between US nuclear personnel and a French delegation in Paris. Ground rules were drawn for future US ballistic missile assistance. The French also gave a detailed technical overview of their missile program. Attached to the letter are the agreed ground rules, "Understanding Between U.S. and France Concerning the Substance and Procedures of Ballistic Missile Cooperation Paper."

The Briefing Book provides guidance for Kissinger's meeting with French Minister of Defense Michel Debré in July 1972. Background and talking points are given for various topics, including US-French ballistic missile cooperation, nuclear safety exchanges, and French military coordination with NATO. The section on ballistic missile assistance gives a list of the specific technical problems France has consulted on to date.