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Documents

November 1967

Statement of Nakajima Kenzo, Chairman of the Board, Opposing the Visit of Prime Minister Sato to the United States and Protesting the Coming to Japan of Chiang Ching-kuo

Nakajima Kenzo, a leading figure in the Japan China Cultural Exchange Association, denounces the impending visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to Japan.

December 19, 1967

Minister of National Defense Chiang’s Visit to Japan

The Japanese Foreign Ministry summarizes Chiang Ching-kuo's recent visit to Japan: who Chiang met with and what he discussed during his meetings; where Chiang travelled and his activities; and the responses, both domestic and foreign, to Chiang's visit.

November 1, 1967

Brief Personal History and Character of Chiang Ching-kuo

A brief chronology and biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, prepared by the Japanese Foreign Ministry ahead of a visit by Chiang to Japan in late 1967.

March 27, 1952

National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952'

The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.

March 16, 1955

National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan'

The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.

February 4, 1957

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Planning for Possible Acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offers to be Vice Premier'

Analysts at the CIA assess whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to become a Vice Premier for the People's Republic of China, following Zhou Enlai's offer to that effect.

August 27, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."

April 9, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-57, 'Likelihood of Military Action by the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."

October 9, 1956

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

August 27, 1957

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China (Advance Conclusions)'

A CIA estimate of the strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, with particular reference to its staying power. The declassified portion of this report includes only the report's summary and conclusions.

Pagination