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April 18, 1951

Review of Andrei Sakharov about Oleg Lavrentiev’s Paper

In this document, Andrei Sakharov, "father" of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb program, positively assesses Oleg Lavrientiev's ideas about the Soviet thermonuclear program, which were expressed in Lavrientiev's previously-written letters to Soviet leaders.

February 2, 1956

Note Containing an Assessment of the Parameters of a Device with Yields of 150 Megatons and One Billion Tons of TNT

A report on the material requirements and design specifications of nuclear devices with yields of 150MT and one milliard tons TNT between Soviet officials. Specifically, the use of lithium-6 deuteride and natural uranium in varying degrees is discussed.

July 1, 1955

Report by the Commission on the Review of the Scientific Principles of Atomic Compression and the Data on the Experimental Device RDS-37

A report on the design of the RDS-37 nuclear device and the implications of radiation implosion induced nuclear fusion on weapons design.

May 26, 1955

Proposal Concerning the Testing of an Experimental System for the Verification of the Casing Design

Proposal to develop a test warhead using radiation implosion to induce a thermonuclear reaction. The proposal emphasizes that the device will be compatible with the existing R-7 ICBM delivery system.

April 21, 1955

Letter to Z. P. Zaveniagin, 'Regarding the Choice of Devices for Strategic Use'

Report describing the relative merits of the RDS-27 and the SD nuclear weapon designs for use on the R-7 "Semyorka" ICBM.

June 8, 1978

Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, 8 June 1978 (excerpt)

Brezhnev reports to the CPSU CC Politburo that the Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov is behaving inappropriately and should be disciplined.

August 29, 1985

Meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, Regarding Yelena Bonner's Request to Travel and Andrei Sakharov's Situation

The Politburo discusses whether to permit Bonner to visit the United States to receive medical treatment and visit relatives, a decision complicated by concern about the potential risk of an embarrassing uproar if her request was denied barely two months before Gorbachev’s planned summit meeting in Geneva with Reagan.

June 2007

The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology.

In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.

June 2007

The Sakharov-Bonner Case. Folder 44. The Chekist Anthology.

In this folder Mitrokhin provides a detailed history of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner’s anti-socialist activities in the Soviet Union as well as their achievements and failures.

June 2007

On Human Rights. Folder 51. The Chekist Anthology.

Outlines the KGB’s response to the USSR’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The accords obligated signatories to respect their citizens’ human rights. This gave Soviet dissidents and westerners leverage in demanding that the USSR end persecution on the basis of religious or political beliefs.

Some of the KGB’s active measures included the establishment of a charitable fund dedicated to helping victims of imperialism and capitalism, and the fabrication of a letter from a Ukrainian group to FRG President Walter Scheel describing human rights violations in West Germany. The document also mentions that the Soviet Ministry of Defense obtained an outline of the various European powers’ positions on human rights issues as presented at the March 1977 meeting of the European Economic Community in London from the Italian Foreign Ministry.

The KGB also initiated Operation “Raskol” [“Schism”], which ran between 1977 and 1980. This operation included active measures to discredit Soviet dissidents Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, measures designed to drive a wedge between the US and its democratic allies, and measures intended to convince the US government that continued support for the dissident movement did nothing to harm the position of the USSR.