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October 28, 1966

The Issue of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Conversations of Comrade Gromyko with US Government Officials During the 21st Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA)

This document includes accounts of several conversations between Soviet officials and US diplomats, including Andrei Gromyko for the Soviets, and Dean Rusk and Arthur Goldberg for the Americans. The most pressing topic discussed during these meetings was figuring out mutually acceptable language to mollify Soviet demands that the NPT contain explicit prohibitions on the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries not just directly but through a military alliance, namely, NATO, remembering previous US attempts to nuclearize NATO through the Multilateral Force (MLF). Some attention is paid to fears not just of the Soviet Union but the US and other NATO allies as well about the FRG acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition to the focus on the semantic differences in the Soviet and American drafts of the NPT, the document emphasizes that one key area of common ground between the Soviets and Americans is the importance that an agreement be reached sooner rather than later before more countries acquire nuclear capabilities.

November 22, 1966

Concerning Roshchin's Conversation with Foster on November 17, 1966

This note summarizes a conversation between Alexei Roshchin and William Foster concerning Foster's views on individual provisions of the Soviet draft of the NPT, with Foster's primary concerns pertaining to Article I. The main issue of contention between the Soviet and American drafts is whether to explicitly prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons on a group basis or within an alliance, as the Soviets desire, but to which the Americans do not want explicitly stated in the Treaty. Roshchin conveyed the readiness of the Soviets to continue discussions on Article I, to which Foster's response that he would need to coordinate with the White House on the official posture of the US government toward the new Soviet language on the issue.

May 1968

Memo to V. V. Kuznetsov Regarding Proposed Clarifications to the NPT

This memo to Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, includes proposed amendments and clarifications to various articles and sections of the NPT. Topics of the proposed amendments include an emphasis on the continued importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the exchange of research and technology on peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The document also describes how to proceed in negotiations with the American side, as well as with several Warsaw Pact countries, and to telegraph once the requests in the memo have been delivered.


Memo to the Soviet Ambassador to India: Appeal to the Leadership of the Indian Communist Party on the Question of the NPT

In this memo, the Soviet Ambassador to India is urged to meet with the leadership of the Indian Communist Party (Rao and Dange) and inform them, in light of the 22nd UN General Assembly session discussing the NPT, of the Soviet stance on the Treaty. The ambassador is instructed to emphasize the importance of nuclear non-proliferation for international geopolitical reasons, including preventing West Germany and China from acquiring nuclear weapons, as well as increasing domestic prosperity by using the atom for peaceful means. The ambassador is told to emphasize efforts of the USSR to prepare the draft treaty in collaboration with non-nuclear countries, as well as security guarantees in place for non-nuclear countries so that the Indian government greets the Treaty with understanding.

March 1968

Instructions to Soviet Ambassadors in Socialist States

Talking points for Soviet ambassadors to Socialist states to use in conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ambassadors are told to relay the message that adherence to the NPT is beneficial for all Socialist nations and their allies.

March 1968

Instructions to the Soviet representatives being sent to several countries for conversations on the draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Soviet representatives being sent to Italy, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, and Italy, are instructed to visit the head of state or the minister of foreign affairs and relay the oral declarations contained in this document. The country-specific oral declarations reinforce the Soviet position against the use of nuclear technology for militaristic objectives and object to proposed measures that would undermine the efficacy of the NPT.

March 1968

Telegram, 'To the Soviet Representative'

Sent to the Soviet representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, this document lists the nations to which the representative must pay the most attention at the UN meeting. The document also underlines how the Soviet representative should speak with members of the American delegation in reference to any diplomatic collaboration on the NPT.

March 1968

Memo to Soviet Ambassadors to Notify Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Soviet Views regarding the NPT and Various Proposed Amendments

Document is notifying Soviet ambassadors to visit respective heads of state and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and inform them of the Soviet position on the draft treaty of the NPT given that the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament recently finished its deliberations on the Treaty and submitted it to the UNGA.

June 1968

Statement by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces its decision to open the NPT for signing in Moscow, Washington, and London beginning on July 1, 1968.

June 1968

Official Note, 'To Embassies in Moscow Regarding the Opening of the NPT for Signing'

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially invites foreign countries to send their representatives to sign the NPT in Moscow on July 1. While detailing the exact times and places at which the treaty will be signed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a distinction between representatives with formal credentials and temporary credentials. Those with temporary credentials may sign the treaty, but their signature will later be replaced with that of a representative with the correct credentials. As stated in the document, Andrei Gromyko is chosen to sign the treaty in the name of the USSR.