Kohl and Nazarbaev dissus a variety of issues including Russia, China, NATO enlargement and the domestic situation in Iran against the backdrop of the end of Rafsandjani's tenure in 1997. Kohl reiterates his willingness to engage Iran. At the same time, he stresses the need for Iran to move first in order to show goodwill.

Kohl and Yeltsin talk about the convocation of regular German-Russian summits including their relevant ministers. They review Yeltsin's meeting with Clinton in Helsinki on NATO enlargmement in March 1997 when Yeltsin gave his consent to the conclusion of a NATO-Russia partnership treaty based on the condition that NATO would not deploy nuclear armaments and permanent conventional forces in its new member states. Kohl points to the long-term perspective and the importance of concluding the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Kohl and Suharto discuss questions of Indonesia's internatioal role, the situation in South East Asia and trade with Germany. Suharto underlines his efforts to work for Indonesia’s movement toward the position of the G-7. Moreover, Kohl and Suharto discuss the sale of former East German navy ships for Indonesia.

Kohl and Rao discuss the state of German-Indian relations, especially in terms of trade. Rao complains about problems with regards to the import of dual-use goods from Germany. India's feelings were hurt as the country was treaty in the same way as Libya. Kohl makes a case for caution saying that "Germany must not become the global arms exporter number one.“

Kohl and Miyazawa talk about financial aid for Russia and preparations for the 1992 World Economic Summit as well as Kohl's request for additional Japanese economic support for Russia. In contrast, Miyazawa highlights the importance of the unresolved territorial question over the Kuriles.

This record contains summaries of: (1) the tête-à-tête meeting between President Clinton and Prime Minister Mizazawa; (2) a small group meeting involving the President and Prime Minister, as well as several senior members of the US and Japanese cabinets; and (3) an expanded working lunch. Topics of discussion included U.S.-Japan strategic and economic relations, climate change, the Uruguay Round, policies towards Russia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Haiti, and China, and Japan's status at the United Nations. Various portions of the document were withheld, including an entire section on North Korea.