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Documents

October 9, 1956

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

August 29, 1958

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Morale on the Major Offshore Islands and on Taiwan'

A report on the situation on Quemoy (Jinmen), Matsu (Mazu), and Taiwan and US support for the Republic of China (Taiwan).

September 10, 1954

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4/1-54: The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands off the Coast of Mainland China

A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.

July 7, 1977

Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China'

Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.

December 13, 1982

Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Bush and Pakistani President Zia, December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m.

Bush and Zia discuss the Soviet war in Afghanistan, China's relations with Pakistan and the US, the status of Taiwan, and the Pakistani nuclear program.

January 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment'

The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle."

This document has been review and declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on at least two separate occasions. The above version was approved for release on January 20, 2010. An alternative version, with different material withheld, was approved for release on May 12, 2011.

September 5, 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'China's Active Diplomacy in Latin America'

The CIA anticipates diplomatic victories for the PRC in Latin America as more countries will switch recognition away from Taiwan.

This version of the report was declassified on October 5, 2010. The CIA declassified the same report again on June 30, 2011. Each version has different sections that were withheld from public release. Both versions of the report should be consulted by readers.

March 17, 1983

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'China and the Asian Development Bank'

A report on China's request for membership in the Asian Development Bank and its demand for Taiwan's expulsion from the ADB.

March 19, 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Chinese Tactics and Motives in Dealing with the US'

The CIA assesses that the Chinese leadership is taking a more confrontational stance in order to win concessions from the United States vis-à-vis Taiwan.

July 7, 1977

Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China'

Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.

Pagination