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April 3, 1963

From the Journal of A.I. Alekseyev, 'Record of a Conversation with Raul Castro Ruz, Minister of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba, 25 March 1963'

Raul Castro reports on the OLO Leadership's decisions regarding Fidel's trip to Moscow.

June 3, 1963

From the Journal of A.I. Alekseyev, 'Record of a Conversation with Raul Castro Ruz, Minister of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba, 25 March 1963'

Fidel Castro decides on dates for his visit to the Soviet Union, discusses publicity and a potential hunting trip with Khrushchev, and requests that the details of the trip remain secret.

March 31, 1963

From the Journal of A.I. Alekseyev, 'Record of a Conversation with Raul Castro Ruz, Minister of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba, 27 February 1963'

Raul Castro requests that Major [Sunyol] be given or sold an automobile while in Moscow.

March 20, 1965

Minutes of Conversation between Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro and Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka, Warsaw, 20 March 1965

During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

November 2, 1962

Cable from Japanese Embassy in Moscow to Tokyo

Describes the domestic reaction in Moscow following the Cuban Blockade by the US. The cable discusses how the real sense of crisis had been widespread in society, and that after the crisis was over there was a sense of relief.

October 24, 1962

Cable from Japanese Embassy in Moscow to Tokyo

A cable from the Foreign Minister Ohira to the Charges d'affaires ad interim Shigemitsu regarding the situation in Moscow over the Cuban blockade. The cable gives an overall report of the atmosphere in Moscow by describing the people and press gathered around the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

December 12, 1962

Report of the Conversation by Carlos Rafael Rodrigeuez with Nikita Jruschov, with the Presence of Anastas Mikoyan on 11 December 1962

Report form Carlos Rafael Rodriguez about his interview with Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow on 11 December 1962. "Dinner with Khrushchev" notes: Rodriguez writes about a dinner he attended with Mikoyan, Khrushchev, official delegates, and friends.

October 27, 1962

Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev

A message from Gromyko to Alekseev to relay a message to Castro regarding American invasion.

January 11, 1967

Cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Cuban Intelligence Services

The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.

January 21, 1988

Memorandum of Conversation between the International Olympic Committee President and Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the USSR, regarding the negotiations with North Korea on the 1988 Olympics

Memorandum of a discussion between IOC President Samaranch and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shevardnadze. The two discuss other issues for a while before turning to the "Korea question," as Shevardnadze puts it. Samaranch explains the series of discussions and compromises that have already occurred, as well as expresses some doubt that North Korea is serious about making cooperation happen and that he'd need assurance about the "Olympic family" being able to cross the border. Shevardnadze expresses confidence that that wouldn't be a problem.

Pagination