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December 6, 1973

Agreement on Cooperation between the Stasi and the KGB, 6 December 1973

1973 agreement between the Stasi and the KGB outlining their cooperative efforts to fight "ideological subversion" and uncover "the hostile plans of the enemy." Both secret services would also exchange information gathered by their espionage activities and provide mutual support in infiltrating agents. Of particular mutual interest was espionage against the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. To this end, the KGB was permitted to recruit East German citizens, and the MfS would secure their ongoing contacts.

November 9, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 9 November 1962

Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

October 27, 1962

Cable from Federal Republic of Germany Embassy, Washington (Knappstein)

A cable from the West German Embassy in Washington, D.C. discussing the threat to American security posed by an "offensive" Soviet base in Cuba, insights provided by recent intelligence, the purpose and the impact of the American blockade of Cuba, negotiations that have taken place at the United Nations, Soviet intentions during the Cuban crisis and, finally, a comparison of Cuba to the situation in Berlin.

October 23, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60

Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

July 1, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39

Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.

June 20, 1961

Free Europe Committee Proposal to Exploit Berlin Crisis

FEC Directors C. D. Jackson and Whitney Debevoise discuss with State Department officials their ideas on using RFE to pressure the Soviets during the Berlin Crisis

February 24, 1959

Charles Douglas Jackson’s Views on Eastern Europe

C.D. Jackson, in a personal letter to Allen Dulles, suggests reviving the concept of liberation of Eastern Europe.

September 24, 1987

Procedure concerning Operative Advance Notification on Cross-Border Transit requested by DPRK Security Organs

Stasi procedures for South Koreans transiting via East Germany for meetings with DPRK officials.

May 31, 1988

Stasi Advance Notification and Instructions to Border Organs

An individual example of a Stasi advance notification and instructions for a Korean transiting East Germany to meet with DPRK officials.

October 10, 1988

Note about a Conversation with the DPRK Ambassador to the GDR, Comrade Pak Yeong-chan, on 10 October 1988 in Berlin

DPRK Ambassador Pak Yeong-chan discusses Hungary's decision to recognize the South Korean government, East German-North Korean relations, and procedures for North Korean citizens traveling to West Berlin.

Pagination