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Aerial view of National Mall

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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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Western Europe

France

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

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Anti-Nuclear Peace Movements

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Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)

1957-

Photo of the Geneva Conference of 1954

Geneva Conference of 1954

Nuclear Proliferation

Photograph of Helmut Kohl, 1982.

Kohl, Helmut

1930- 2017

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Helmut Kohl addresses the United Nations, June 1997.

Helmut Kohl Transcripts

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Eden, Anthony, Earl of Avon

1897- 1977

Pakistani Nuclear History

Sino-Soviet Relations

Margaret Thatcher in 1984

Thatcher, Margaret

1925- 2013

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September 6, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Thursday, 5 September 1991, 13:15 until 13:30 hours Kohl and Gorbachev scrutinize the situation in the Soviet Union after the coup. They agree on the urgent need for more for financial help.
July 24, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with American President Bush During Breakfast on Monday, 15 July 1991, in London Kohl and Bush debate NATO's reform, NATO's forthcoming summit and France's international role as well as economic assistance for the Soviet Union and the relevance of the London World Economic Summit.
July 2, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand on Saturday, 29 June 1991, in Luxembourg Kohl and Mitterrand discuss the situation in Yugoslavia and Northern Africa as well as NATO and European security.
June 13, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Bonn, 13 June 1991, 11:45 am to 12:45 pm Kohl and Mulroney look back into Canada's role as a supporter of German unification. Mulroney highlights the relevance of his personal diplomacy in this endeavor. In addition, they discuss financial aid for the Soviet Union and preparations for the London World Economic Summit.
June 10, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with British Prime Minister Major on Sunday, 9 June 1991, in Chequers Kohl and Major examine the state of European integration. Britain's position in the EC, the Political Union as well as the Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, they discuss the idea for the creation of a European policy force.
December 24, 1962	Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Discussion with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 December [1962]: 'Planning Requirements Resulting from the Nassau Pact and the JUPITER Decision' JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy’s Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the “closely held decisions.” This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the “planning requirements” necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.
January 26, 1968	"Defence And Oversea Policy Committee: Non-Proliferation: Memorandum By The Minister Of State For Foreign Affairs " Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.
October 2, 1967	Letter from Derek Day (Foreign Office) to Michael Palliser (Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister) Responding to a request from Michael Palliser (Wilson's Private Secretary for foreign affairs), the Foreign Office's seasoned Europe-watcher Derek Day argued that the government needed to balance three – sometimes conflicting – UK interests. First, there was the position as a European power, particularly with regard to the ongoing EEC application. Second, there was the UK's status as a nuclear power, in which the UK shared “special responsibilities” with the US, exemplified by the UK's acquisition of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles as its primary nuclear deterrent. Third, there was the desire to see a non-proliferation treaty concluded, which sometimes meant disagreement with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Day contended that the United Kingdom seemed to have been successful in positioning itself as understanding European anxieties, with Bonn having congratulated Wilson's administration on bring “good Europeans.” Day's assessment was seen and lauded by Wilson, who hoped that it was correct.
September 21, 1967	Memorandum from George Brown to Harold Wilson When the USSR and the USA submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty in the early autumn of 1967, British representatives were enthusiastically arguing that as a prospective member of EURATOM, any British position must axiomatically take account of European interests. As the negotiations moved forward, though, Wilson's government found itself caught in a three-sided trap of its own devising: fearful of being labelled “bad Europeans,” anxious about being seen by Washington as “unreliable allies,” and concerned about Moscow viewing them as part of the “treacherous West.” Balancing out these competing concerns was becoming foremost in the minds of senior ministers.
May 18, 1967	Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 'Non-Proliferation' By the early summer of 1967, Foreign Secretary George Brown felt compelled to comment that "if the situation should arise in which there is a direct confrontation between the United States and Russians on one side—and the members of EURATOM on the other, on the issue of the acceptability of EURATOM safeguards we should have to consider our position very carefully: the whole success of our European policy might depend on the choice we made. For the present it should therefore be a major aim of our policy at Geneva to see that things do not reach such a state." This came only a week after Wilson formally launched the UK's bid to become a member of the EEC, and two days after De Gaulle cast doubt on Britain's fitness to join the community.