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1983

30 Questions and Honest Answers about CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament]

Pamphlet produced by the Coalition for Peace through Security, using the same format and questions as a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament pamphlet but with a very similar title but providing markedly different answers.

July 15, 1991

Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on July 15, 1991

Bush, Kohl, and others discuss relations with France and France's views of NATO, talks between the US and the USSR over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), safeguarding the Brazilian rainforest, the Uruguay Round of the GATT, support for economic reforms in the Soviet Union, and US-German relations.

January 28, 1991

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany, January 28, 1991, 11:50-11:57 a.m.

During a second phone call on the same day, Bush and Kohl quickly discuss Germany's financial contributions to the Gulf War.

January 28, 1991

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany, January 28, 1991, 11:08-11:28 a.m.

On a phone call, Bush and Kohl discuss the Gulf War, including the evacuation of Iraqi planes to Iran, Saddam Hussein's state of mind, the role of Turkey, and German's financial contribution.

October 1967

Alva Myrdal, 'New Roads to Disarmament'

The author of “New Roads to Disarmament," Alva Myrdal was head of Swedish disarmament policy from 1962 to 1973. In her 1967 paper presented at the Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, Belgrade, and Zagreb in 1967, Myrdalpositions nuclear disarmament in its broader context and elaborates on her visions of a new world order. She would publicize many of these same thoughts and observations in her 1976 book, The Game of Disarmament. How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race. In 1982, she received the Nobel Peace Prize for her work on disarmament.

July 30, 1955

Shortened Transcript of the Meeting held by the 2nd Chief Directorate of the KGB attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR on July 30, 1955

This document is a 61-page transcript of the meeting of the SCD leadership held in Moscow on Saturday, July 30, 1955. The ostensible purpose of the meeting was to discuss the progress report of the regional counterintelligence branch in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Second Department of the KGB of the Latvian SSR). However, the meeting went beyond the Latvian case and focused on the discussion of the overall deficiencies of Soviet counterintelligence at that time and the ways to deal with them.

December 25, 1979

Cable from the Foreign Ministry, 'Notice on the Cambodian Situation and Changes in the Government of Democratic Cambodia'

The Chinese Foreign Ministry provides an update on the leadership in Cambodia and the Cambodian-Vietnamese war.

June 28, 1974

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice [Zhongfa] (1979) No. 19: Notice on the Talks between Chairman Mao and Edward Heath

A summary of a conversation between Mao Zedong and Edward Heath. Topics covered include the Watergate scandal, European security, bilateral relations between the PRC and the UK, and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

February 1987

First Assessment of the Military Content of the 24th International Wehrkunde Conference from 31 January to 1 February 1987 in Munich

The report looks into the 24th Internationale Wehrkundetagung in Munich focusing on "Perspectives of NATO" and emphasizing a continued NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons and the strategy of flexible response. NATO policymakers did not endorse Egon Bahr's scheme for the creation of a nuclear- and chemical-weapons free zone in Europe.

December 3, 1956

Middle East (Situation): Debated in the Commons Chamber, Monday, 3 December 1956

In July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) nationalized the Suez Canal Company, surprising the world. The government of France, in whose capital of Paris the company was headquartered, and the British government, the company’s plurality shareholder, sought to reverse nationalization in court, but failed—even though they clad their case in the language not of imperial self-interest but, rather, of international public interest. The time in which such language was somewhat acceptable, even at home, was passing, and the Suez Crisis played a big part in this final act.

At the same time, the two governments early on after the canal nationalization decided to remove Nasser by force, for re-compensation was not their central concern. France believed Nasser was enabling the FLN, which in 1954 had started Algeria’s War for Independence, and Britain wanted some say in the canal, which had for decades been its worldwide empire’s “swing-door,” as a member of parliament, Anthony Eden (1897-1977), called it in 1929. In August 1956 France began discussing a joint operation with Israel, which wanted Nasser gone, too, and the Red Sea opened for Israel-bound ships. In early October the two were joined by Britain. On the 29th, Israel invaded the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. On the 30th, France and Britain gave Israel and Egypt a 12-hour ultimatum to cease hostilities, or they would intervene—and Anglo-French forces bombed Egyptian forces from the 31st and on November 5-6 occupied the canal’s northern tip. Although a power play, “Operation Musketeer,” like the court case, could not be an open imperial move anymore, then, and did not present itself to the world as such. No matter: especially in colonies and postcolonial countries, people were outraged.

More problematically for France and Britain, Washington was incredulous. This Middle Eastern affair triggered the worst crisis of the 1950s between America’s rising international empire and Europe’s descending empires, and indeed clarified and accelerated that descent. President Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969) fumed that Prime Ministers Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet (1905-1977) had disregarded his administration’s opposition to military action. Worse, they had deceived him about their intentions. And worst, their attack on Egypt undermined the supreme US tenet: Soviet containment. The Americans were by association tainted by their NATO allies’ imperialist move while the Soviets looked good—on November 5 they offered Egypt troops and threatened to nuke London, Paris, and Tel Aviv—and that although they had just repressed an uprising in Hungary.

On the very day of the ultimatum, October 30, Eisenhower washed his hands of that move on live US television, and the US mission at the UN organized a cease-fire resolution vote in the Security Council. France and Britain vetoed it. Although sharing its European allies’ emotions about Nasser, the US administration withheld critical oil and monetary supplies from them to bring them to heel and withdraw from Egypt—after which, it promised, they would be warmly welcomed back. It ceased most bilateral communications and froze almost all everyday social interactions with its two allies, even cancelling a scheduled visit by Eden. And it badgered its allies at the UN, supporting an Afro-Asian resolution that on November 24 called Israel, Britain, and France to withdraw forthwith. On December 3, the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd took the floor in the House of Commons.

Pagination