Unofficial translation of correspondence between PM Craxi and President Reagan regarding strategic arms limitations and deterrence. Reagan outlines the planned US measures given lack of effort and willingness by the USSR to arrive to a binding agreement.

Vice Secretary General of NATO Rinaldo Petrignani sends PM Giulio Andreotti a report from the meeting of the Italian Atlatic Committee regarding Western European security situation and the threat posed by political and military modernization in the Soviet Union, and in particular, the introduction of SS20 missiles.

Summary of the 13th NPG meeting in Ankara in May 1973. Italian Minister of Defense, Tanassi, raises the issue of reviewing the process of launching nuclear weapons in order to secure the potential military and political advantages.

Speech by the Minister of Defense providing an overview of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Copenhagen. Focuses on the problems of "when" and "why" of employment of nuclear arms in Europe.

Document sent from Minister of Defense Tanassi to Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Topics discussed: comparison of strategic forces (NATO and USSR), studies on potential use of nuclear arms by member states, and the problems of internal consultation within NATO.

The note suggests that French motives for developing nuclear capabilities are political rather than based on national security considerations. France seeks to insure a key role in global political and military balance, and its behavior creates unfavorable conditions for the development of common European defense.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”