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August 1, 1958

Second Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, August 1, 1958, in Zhongnanhai

On this second day of the talks, international affairs were the main topic of conversation. From the Soviet record, which like those of the first and the next discussion, was made by Fedorenko and the third secretary of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anatolii I. Filyov, it is evident that the atmosphere was fully relaxed, anti-imperialism brought the communist leaders together. Both hated America, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and their leaders. They discussed the situation in the Near East in detail and were heartened by the victory of leftist forces in Iraq. They joked a lot. And only at the end did Mao lightly touch upon his claims to Khrushchev, who at once reminded the Chinese leader of the Soviet advisors. It was obvious that this question continued to bother him, and Khrushchev exacerbated his grievance.

April 29, 1993

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with the Chairman of Iran's Foreign Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee and Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Mister Hassan Rouhani, on 29 April 1993 in Bonn

Schmidbauer and Rouhani review the state of bilateral relations. They discuss Iran's arms control policy and its interest in the aquisitation of nuclear technology for peaceful uses, as Rouhani argues. Rouhani reiterates Iran's readiness for whatever kind of international nuclear inspections. Iran's interest was still the finalization of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

September 14, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on Monday, 14 September 1992

Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in the Near and Middle East and the changed in Syria's position toward Israel after the demise of the Soviet Union. Rabin expresses concern about the continued arms race in the region and Syria's purchases of Scud missiles from Russia and Slovakia. He also reiterates Iraq's continued capability to go nuclear within 5 to 6 years despite international arms control inspections. Last but not least, Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in Iran and Kohl's contacts with President Rafsandjani.

June 30, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand over Breakfast on Saturday, 27 June 1992

Mitterrand emphasizes that Yugoslavia could turn into "a second Vietnam” in case of a Western military intervention.  He questions the rational of U.S. and British policy in the Balkans and rejects France's military involvement. Kohl rules out Germany's participation in military operations.

June 2, 1992

One-on-one talks between Minister of State Schmidbauer and Minister of Security Fallahian

Schmidbauer and Fallahian review possibilities for increasing bilateral cooperation in the intelligence field. Schmidbauer does not see any chances to assist Iran in the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He requests Iran's assistance in the release of German hostages in Lebanon.

April 26, 1991

The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand on Wednesday, 24 April 1991, in Paris

Kohl and Mitterrand comment on the situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian question and the idea of convening an international conference on the region.

November 22, 1990

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Breakfast Meeting with President Mitterrand on Wednesday, 21 November 1990 in Paris for the Occasion of the CSCE Summit

Kohl and Mitterrand assess the relevance of the Paris CSCE Summit and the situation in the Gulf, especially UN resolutions on Iraq and the potential use of force under a UN mandate.

October 15, 2020

Interview with Eran Lerman

Eran Lerman is a former Israeli intelligence officer. He served as a member of the Israeli delegation to ACRS. 

November 16, 2020

Interview with Robert Einhorn

Robert Einhorn is a former US diplomat. He served as the head of the US delegation to ACRS. 

December 2, 1947

Report on the Activities of the Arab Office, Washington, for the First Six Months Beginning Nov.1.1945 (Excerpts)

In March 1945, the Arab League (AL) was founded in Cairo. It arrived at the tail-end of a gargantuan four-year-long endeavor to economically integrate the entire Middle East and North and northeast Africa in order to make its polities more self-sufficient during the world war, in which shipping with Allied countries was dangerous and when military trumped civilian needs. This endeavor was supported by national authorities, aided by the United States, and directed by officials of the British Empire. Britain was paramount in the region, and by 1943 its armies, with the US military, evicted all German and Italian troops from North Africa.

Towards the end of the war, the British Empire developed a greater interest in allied Arab countries cooperating more closely. Hence, it backed the establishment of the AL. The latter was not at all simply a British project, though. It also reflected a highly particular version of pan-Arab nationalism: rather than promoting territorial or political unification, it allowed key states to assert their voice in the Arab World.

The Arab League had six founding members. These were Saudi Arabia, a British ally, and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan, which all were in various ways British-ruled; so was Yemen, which joined in May 1945. Though Palestinians worked with it, Palestine was not an official founding member. Britain was not keen. As Palestine’s Mandate power, it continued to heed Yishuvi interests. Moreover, AL member governments were not truly supportive either. They did, however, take a great interest in the Palestine conflict. In November 1945, the AL re-established the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), which first was founded at the start of the Palestine Revolt, in 1936, but outlawed by Britain in 1937. When the AHC imploded due to intra-Palestinian infighting, the AL in 1946 created the Arab Higher Executive, renamed AHC in 1947. Moreover, the AL in 1945 declared a boycott of all Jewish-owned businesses in Palestine. And in 1945, too, it executed plans going back to 1944 to open abroad public relations “Arab Offices” (AO), whose main writ was to explain why Palestine’s Arabs, not the Zionists, should become the sovereign in Palestine. One AO was in London. Another was in Washington, DC, open until 1948, and a third followed in 1946 in New York, open until 1947; they have been treated in Rory Miller’s “More Sinned against than Sinning?: The Case of the Arab Office, Washington” (2004) and Daniel Rickenbacher’s “The Arab League's Propaganda Campaign in the US Against the Establishment of a Jewish State” (2020). 

Supported by some British officials, the AL opened AOs in the United States because it feared Zionist lobbying and public relations there and because it knew the US government would help shape the postwar Middle East, even if Britain was still the premier power. The man behind the idea of the AOs, Musa Alami (1897-1984), and a majority of AO officials, including Ahmed Shukairy (1908-1980), were Palestinians. There were other Arabs, too. One was the Lebanese Nejla Abu-Izzedin (1908-2008), who had received her PhD from the University of Chicago in 1934; another was the Anglo-Lebanese Cecil Hourani (1917-2020), brother of the famous historian Albert Hourani (1915-1993), who discussed the AO in An Unfinished Journey: Lebanon and Beyond (1984).

The text printed here, excerpts from a report, in English, reflects the work of the Washington AO, its travails, and the AL officials’ views of the US. It is noteworthy that the original of the text forms part of a broader file created by the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, the para-state government of the Yishuv in British Mandate Palestine. The file is kept at the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.

Pagination