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July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

October 8, 1992

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran’s Vice Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki on 8 October 1992 at the Chancellor’s Office

Schmidbauer and Maleki review chances for the expansion of cooperation between Germany, Iran and the Islamic states of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, they debate the Hezbollah's involvement in the recent assassination of four Kurdish policymakers in Berlin.

2022

Antonio Mariani, 'The 36th Strategic Interdiction Brigade: An Italian Contribution to the Cold War' (Excerpts)

These excerpts from the memoirs of a former member of Italy’s 36th Air Brigade, published by the Italian Air Force, provides fascinating perspective on the shock felt by officers when they received the dismantling instructions and then how they planned and carried out their tasks. The following sentences convey the emotional reactions: “The dismantling, for those who experienced it, was a real demolition. A frenetic destructive activity pervaded the military community which, almost with anger and a certain sadism, destroyed and reduced to useless remains everything on which it had studied, worked and operated.” As the excerpts makes clear, not everything was destroyed and junked. Consistent with the Joint Staff’s original proposals, sensitive components, such as the warheads were returned to the U.S., while other parts of the missiles were salvaged and made available to other organizations. Some equipment went to Italy’s “San Marco” space research program, just as Prime Minister Fanfani had proposed to President Kennedy during their meeting in January 1963.

To what extent the dismantling procedure in Turkey paralleled the one in Italy remains unclear, at least on the basis of available documentation.

April 25, 1963

Note from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

In a hand-written note, McNamara reports that the last Jupiter missile in Turkey “came down yesterday” and that “The last Jupiter warhead will be flown out of Turkey on Saturday.”

April 17, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1270 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

Reporting on the visit of the Polaris submarine U.S.S. Sam Houston to Izmir, the Embassy finds it to be a “success from all points of view.” The press provided “maximum favorable coverage,” with one headline stating that the “Submarine which scares Soviets is in Izmir.” The press coverage emphasized the “power of atomic sub weapons as deterrent,” the “warmth of welcome extended to ship,” and the “importance of the dignitaries” who visited the ship.

This document is possibly an incomplete cross reference copy, and the original version was not found.

April 10, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1234 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

The U.S. Embassy in Ankara informs the State Department that the exchange of notes has been completed. The agreement text has yet to be declassified.

April 10, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram 4136 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

A SHAPE news release would announce the “courtesy call” by the Polaris submarine, U.S.S. Sam Houston, to Iszmir, Turkey, beginning on April 14. The visit will “provide an opportunity for distinguished Turkish officials to view this latest weapon system to be assigned to the defense of Allied Command Europe.”

April 5, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1208 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

The Embassy informs the Department of last-minute developments concerning the exchange of notes on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement. Hare confirmed with Foreign Minister Erkin that the dismantling would begin on April 15, and that was “reconfirmed … at working level.”

April 5, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram 4035 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

Walter Stoessel, Political Adviser to SACEUR General Lemnitzer, informs the State Department that Secretary of Defense McNamara has written to Turkish Minister of Defense Sancar that a Polaris submarine “on duty” in the Mediterranean would visit the port of Izmir, in compliance with Sancar’s recommendation. Sancar was also informed that, during the Polaris visit on April 14-15, “selected guests will be accommodated.”

March 30, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1905 to the American Embassy Rome

The State Department instructs the embassies in Ankara and Rome of the importance of avoiding “fallacious comparison between Jupiter dismantling and withdrawal Soviet missiles from Cuba.” To help do that, the embassies should ensure that “no official facilitation will be given press or photo coverage of missile dismantling.” In response to any press queries, the embassies could state that “dismantled missiles will be transported over period several weeks.” To avoid an “air of mystery” around the dismantling, the Department opposed efforts to block media coverage of missiles in transit. The embassies should approach Italian and Turkish officials “along [those] lines.”

Pagination