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Documents

July 27, 1953

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)

Eisenhower informs Rhee that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles will be visiting Korea shortly.

July 4, 1953

CPSU Central Committee Decision

About the draft response to Clark's letter from the 29th of June.The decision instructs Malenkov and Molotov to answer the Chinese comrades, and inform them of the Soviet Union's agreement their assessment and the measures proposed on the issue of peace talks in Korea, in connection with the Clark's letter.

June 3, 1953

Record of Molotov's Conversation with US Ambassador Bohlen

A follow-up conversation after the one on the 28th of May. The two discuss the talks that were taking place in Panmunjom, and Bohlen mentions the American men with Soviet wives currently residing in the Soviet Union. Molotov is unaware of this situation.

November 3, 1952

CPSU Politburo Decision with an Approved Message from Pushkin to Stalin

Decision to approve the draft TASS publication denying the reported talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Korean issue.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

June 6, 1953

Statement by President Syngman Rhee

President Syngman Rhee strongly opposed the peace talks between the United Nations, the North Korea People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. Rhee proposed that he would accept this armistice only if the United States signed a Mutual Defense Pact and to continue to build the ROK forces after the war.

July 4, 1953

Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing

Molotov writes to the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing discussing the Korean War armistice.

July 27, 1953

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower

Rhee thanks Eisenhower for US appropriations for South Korea and congratulates him on the Korean War armistice.

July 7, 1953

National Security Council Report, NSC 157/1, 'US Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice'

NSC 157/1 analyzes the situation following the armistice in Korea and the problem of Korea's division in half. The report analyzes the North Korea/Communist, US, and South Korean positions regarding reunification. Although a unified Korea allied militarily with the US is not seen as a possibility, the report concludes that it might still be possible to achieve "a unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK [South Korea]."

July 10, 1951

Letter from General Ridgeway to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Ceasefire Negotiations in Korea

Report from Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea on meetings between the UN Command and North Korea to negotiate an armistice in Korea.

Pagination