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1981

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 23, Moscow, 1981, 431 pp.

The table of contents for volume 23 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Lenin and state security, training and education at the Higher School, intelligence activities of the United States and other adversaries to the Soviet Union, nuclear terrorism, and other subjects.

1980

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 21, Moscow, 1980, 523 pp.

The table of contents for volume 21 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Higher School, the Soviet constitution, the Carter Doctrine and other adversarial intelligence operations, and the theory and practice of counterintelligence, among other subjects.

1976

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 11, Moscow, 1976, 256 pp.

The table of contents for volume 11 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to theory, organization, and tactics of counterintelligence, the "subversive activities" of the United States and other countries, criminology, and other subjects.

1974

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 07, Moscow, 1974, 195 pp.

The table of contents for volume 7 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to intelligence services of the "imperialist states" and adversaries, including the United States, West Germany, and Israel.

November 18, 1967

Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Chinese Communist Problem'

Ahead of a visit by Chiang Ching-kuo to Japan, the Japanese Foreign Ministry reviews the political situation on Mainland China.

November 1967

Statement of Nakajima Kenzo, Chairman of the Board, Opposing the Visit of Prime Minister Sato to the United States and Protesting the Coming to Japan of Chiang Ching-kuo

Nakajima Kenzo, a leading figure in the Japan China Cultural Exchange Association, denounces the impending visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to Japan.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

June 26, 1959

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin)

Boland gauged opinion at the UN and assisted in preparing the ground for Aiken’s campaign in the XIVth Session in the fall of 1959. Ireland cultivated the UN Secretariat, notably Dr. Protitch, who evaluated the Irish proposal as helpful. Likewise, intimations from the Eastern bloc were positive. The Irish Permanent Representative consolidated links with the second-in-command of the U.S. mission to the UN, James W. Barco, to enable a constructive dialogue with the Americans to fashion a resolution they could tolerate

November 20, 1958

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin) (Private and Confidential), New York

The report of Ireland’s permanent representative to the United Nations to his superior, the secretary of the Department of External Affairs, delivers his account of Aiken’s first (failed) attempt to generate support for a resolution in the Thirteenth UN Session. Recognizing the breadth and depth of opposition, he withdrew his draft resolution and instead requested a simple roll call vote in favor of the second paragraph on 31 October – a modest statement acknowledging that an expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states would be harmful to peace and increase obstacles to disarmament. The measure passed with 37 votes and no opposition, although 44 abstentions were recorded. The Soviet bloc supported the maneuver, while Western-aligned countries abstained.  

October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

Pagination