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South Asia

Pakistan

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Western Europe

Sweden

Nuclear Proliferation

Japan's Itsukushima Shrine

East Asia

Japan

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Western Europe

Italy

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Pakistani Nuclear History

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United States. Embassy (Sweden)

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"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Andrei Gromyko at the UN, 1981

Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich

1909- 1989

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United States. Department of State

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Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Indian Nuclear History

Israeli Nuclear History

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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March 22, 1968	Andrei Gromyko, Note to the CPSU CC Andrei Gromyko describes the diplomatic measures he deems necessary to ensure the adherence of influential nations and countries in the Socialist sphere to the NPT. Valuing negotiation and diplomatic conversations between representatives, Gromyko especially seeks to obtain the support of countries who have previously expressed reservations about the treaty.
January 20, 1966	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation' This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.
November 4, 1978	'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al. U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."
November 7, 1978	'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Sweden cable 4456 to State Department Swedish response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.
November 21, 1978	US Embassy Stockholm Cable 4662 to State Department, 'UK Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant' Cable from U.S. Embassy in Stockholm debating Swedish responsiveness to U.S. and British demarches on inverters and reprocessing technology. It was an open question whether the Swedes were putting inverters on their trigger list and the U.S. would stay in touch with their British colleagues.