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Documents

December 22, 1976

Policy Planning Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 'Notes on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia'

Analysis of and proposed response to Pakistan's nuclear-weapon-free zone proposal.

December 22, 1976

UN and Conference Divisions, Ministry of External Affairs, 'Brief on India’s position on the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia'

Considerations of Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

April 30, 1975

Telegram from L.L. Mehorta, Charge d’Affaires in Beijing

China’s stance towards India and Pakistan, and a Pakistani proposal for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia

July 6, 1965

Note, A. S. Gonsalves to Ministry of External Affairs, 'Nuclear Guarantee'

Pakistan refutes a nuclear umbrella from the superpowers because she thought it to be inconsistent with the proposal of non-dissemination and denuclearization.

December 18, 1986

Regarding the Results of the Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to India

This document reports on the visit by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to India in 1986. The report recounts an ever-deepening relationship between India and the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons for the Indian position is the strong support for Pakistan by the US, the delivery of modern weaponry to this country together with concerns that Pakistan will soon develop nuclear weapons. Gandhi also accuses Pakistan of training Sikh terrorists on its territory. The Soviet side intends to further intensify its relations with India and to upgrade them by treating India as a full-fledged world power. The aim is to establish a long-term special relationship with India based on common principles in the foreign arena and close collaboration in all other fields.

December 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States'

This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

December 15, 1995

Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

December 15, 1995

Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

June 26, 1972

US Mission Geneva Cable 2755 to State Department, 'Japanese-Pakistani Conversations Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

Report on conversations between Japanese officials and a Pakistani source who indicated the location of the upcoming Indian nuclear test. The cable expressed doubts about the information, suggesting that the "stir" "may have been created largely on personal basis" by the Pakistani source.

Pagination