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Documents

1997

Excerpts from "Calendar of Events in the History of the Sapper Branch of the People's Army of Vietnam (1967-1997)"

Translated excerpts from an official People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) publication which gives a timeline of events of the "Sapper Branch," the Vietnamese army’s commando/special forces troops. These excerpts discuss the Sapper's training of foreign commando forces from Cuba, El Salvador and the Soviet Union.

1992

Excerpts from official Vietnamese "Sapper Handbook"

Translated excerpts from an official People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) handbook for the elite "Sapper" forces, Vietnamese army’s commando/special forces troops. These excerpts discuss the Sapper's training of foreign commando forces from countries such as Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

1982

Excerpts from ''Ordnance: Chronology of Historical Events, Volume 2''

Excerpts from an internal Vietnamese army history which describes the shipment of weapons internationally, likely to aid revolutionaries in Latin America. Also describes a visit by the military attaché of the Cuban embassy in Vietnam to the weapons warehouse.

November 20, 1984

Information on Changes in the Strategic and Tactical Struggle of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL)

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.