A report on the foreign opinions regarding the KWP's 6th Congress, stating that the North Korean ideology lacks Marxist elements.

Minister Kim briefs Mrs. Rhee on the Japanese Asian development plan, Philippines' attempt to bid for the SEATO post of Secretary-general, and Philippines' membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Soviet side provides information regarding missing Norwegian citizens. They then discuss the draft communique regarding trade and cooperation between Norway and the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev presents a draft agreement for maintaining contact with the Norwegian Labor Party and invites Gerhardsen and Skaug to visit the Soviet Union.

Gerhardsen and Skaug discuss trade between the USSR and Norway; control of the border river Pasvikelv (Paatso-Ioki) and the mutual exploitation of its hydro-energy resources; Norwegians citizens located in the Soviet Union, and Soviet-Norwegian cultural ties.

The Dutch Ambassador reports on North Korean overtures such as sending propaganda and an invitation to a cocktail-laced viewing of a movie about the USS Pueblo (which was ignored). Having inquired with other NATO countries' representatives it turned out that only the Luxemburg representative received the same literature while only the Norwegian representative was invited to the cocktail party.

A conversation between Chargé d’Affaires Huang Wenyou and Cuban Foreign Trade Minister, Alberto Mora Becerra. They discussed China-Cuba relations (Chinese support of Cuba) and an incident in which Chinese comrades forced a Norwegian ship to go to Cuba.

This document summarizes the objectives of a 1977 Warsaw Pact reconnaissance military exercise intended to gather information about enemy defensive capabilities on the islands off the coast of Denmark and Norway, particularly Zealand.

Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.

In this folder Mitrokhin expresses the KGB’s concerns regarding the potential for Yuri Orlov’s nomination for a Nobel Prize. Orlov was well known in the Soviet Union for his dissident activities and for organizing the Moscow Helsinki Group to monitor Soviet adherence to the 1975 Helsinki Accords. According to Mitrokhin, he openly supported all anti-soviet groups and organized public protests for the Soviet human rights movement. As the KGB was concerned, they made many efforts to take the movement under control, but these did not lead to success. Mitrokhin provides examples of the KGB’s attempts to stop Orlov’s activism.

Mitrokhin states that the West, however, was in extreme support of Orlov’s ideology. In order to help his movement to gain more influence, Western officials nominated Orlov for the Nobel Prize in 1978. The KGB immediately developed a complex plan to assure Nobel officials that Orlov did not deserve the prize and that it would have been unfavorable for the prestige of the Nobel Prize if Orlov was awarded it. Mitrokhin states that KGB chief Yuri Andropov took control over the operation because Orlov winning the prize would have been crucially harmful for the Soviet political system. Mitrokhin provides the detailed plan in this entry.

A KGB resident in Oslo sent an urgent telegram to Moscow on October 27, 1978 stating that Anwar El Sadat and Menachem Begin became laureates of the Nobel Peace prize. Mitrokhin provides full telegram text in this entry and also states that the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his satisfaction with the fact that Orlov did not win the prize because it would have negatively affected relations between the two countries.