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October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

July 5, 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, on 4 July 1994 from 9.55 to 11.05 a.m. at the Federal Chancellery

Kohl and Li Peng discuss human rights in China and the Chinese interpretation of the Tiananmen   Square protests and massacre of 1989. Moreover, they review the relationship between the Vatican and China, German policy on Taiwan, China and  GATT, China and the USA as well as EC trade restrictions vis-à-vis China.

March 27, 1952

National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952'

The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.

March 16, 1955

National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan'

The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.

March 11, 1964

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-64, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China'

The CIA assesses Taiwan's future in the wake of France's normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The report covers US-Republic of China relations and likely developments in Taiwan's internal security, politics, and international recognition.

June 20, 1961

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-61, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate about the future of the Republic of China assesses the status of the China debate at the United Nations, KMT efforts to retake the mainland, the political status of local Taiwanese in the ROC, and other political and diplomatic issues.

February 4, 1957

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Planning for Possible Acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offers to be Vice Premier'

Analysts at the CIA assess whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to become a Vice Premier for the People's Republic of China, following Zhou Enlai's offer to that effect.

August 27, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."

April 9, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-57, 'Likelihood of Military Action by the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."

October 9, 1956

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

Pagination