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January 29, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1416 to the American Embassy Rome

Responding to Finletter’s request, the State Department provides a statement on the Jupiters for the NAC meeting on January 30, 1963. It explained that the U.S. cannot bring up the matter unilaterally until consultations with Italy and Turkey have progressed. Finletter should coordinate delivery of the statement with Italian and Turkish representatives while Reinhard and Hare work with the Italians and Turks in preparing a written statement that can be presented to the NAC at a later stage. While the Italians were willing to join the statement, it is not clear whether Turkey did or whether the statement was made to the NAC on January 30.

January 25, 1963

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, 'Briefing on Cuban Developments' [Excerpts]

During a briefing on Cuban developments to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, Secretary of State Rusk denied that there was any connection between the removal of the Jupiters and the solution of the Caribbean crisis, presenting the withdrawal instead as part of the “entire program of modernization of NATO forces,” together, in the Italian case, with the substitution of Corporal missiles with Sergeants (see pages 23-26).

January 25, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram POLTO 879 to the Seceretary of State, Washington, DC

Kennedy’s press statements and announcements by Italy and Turkey of agreements with the U.S. on the Jupiters put the U.S. Mission to NATO in an awkward position because “most NAC members learned of withdrawal of Jupiters from press.” Moreover, an internal memo to NATO’s Secretary General complained about the U.S. failure to consult with the Alliance. Ambassador Finletter here asked the Department to provide a statement that he could make to the NAC at its January 30 meeting.

January 24, 1963

Department of State Telegram 634 to American Embassy Ankara

The early delivery of F-104G’s was a crucial element in the negotiations with Turkey over the Jupiters, and the U.S. planning on the deliveries was moving forward. The State Department, however, wanted Turkish authorities to understand that the timing of the deliveries “will depend on such progress in negotiations that it is clear GOT [Government of Turkey] will agree to dismantle JUPITERS.”

January 24, 1963

American Embassy Rome Telegram 1469 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

The Embassy reported on the Council of Ministers decisions and the related communique. The latter made only general references to “modernization of arms of alliance” without mentioning Jupiters or Polaris, which was probably Fanfani’s preference. According to Reinhardt, Fanfani told him that the Council had “unanimously approved” the agreement that he and Kennedy had reached.

January 24, 1963

Diary Entry of Amintore Fanfani for 24 January 1963 [Excerpt]

In his diary, Fanfani recorded that the Council of Ministers has approved his report on the talks with President Kennedy and the recommendation to withdraw the Jupiters on April 1, 1963. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense would have a “mandate” to implement the withdrawal. As agreed, the Jupiters would be replaced by Polaris, and the latter would not be based in Italy. Italy would support a NATO multilateral force, without the tripartite directorate that De Gaulle had espoused.

January 22, 1963

American Embassy Rome Telegram 1451 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

The State Department sent a proposed statement (not yet identified) on the Jupiters to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for Fanfani to consider, but the Italian prime minister was holding it “exclusively” at his office. Fanfani was involved in “delicate maneuverings” on the Jupiters with the Socialists and other “center-left groups,” and leaks by “indiscreet” Foreign Office officials could harm the talks. 

Concerning President Kennedy’s proposed remarks on the Jupiters for a press conference, Fanfani understood that Kennedy had to tell the press something but hoped that he “will say as little as possible.” According to Fanfani, “too much talk and too many details will give ammunition to communists and left wing” socialists.  When Kennedy held his press conference a few days later, he said the minimum, with only a passing reference to Jupiters.

January 19, 1963

Joint Chiefs of Staff Message to U.S. CINCEUR [Commander in Chief European Command], 'Rationale of the JUPITER Decision'

That the Commander of U.S. European Command (CINCEUR), Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, was a critic of the Jupiter removals may have informed a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision to send him a background paper explaining U.S. decisions that could also be used for discussions within NATO.   The backgrounder provided information comparing the reliability, vulnerability, and survivability, among other features, of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles. While the withdrawal of Thor and Jupiter missiles reduced Western “nuclear potential,” those reductions would be offset by an increase from 350 to about 800 U.S. strategic ballistic missiles, “some of which will be assigned to NATO targets.” Further, it “may be assumed that there will be no reduction in the present expectation of timely damage to the ACE [Allied Command Europe] targets presently covered by the Jupiters.”

January 18, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1250 to the American Embassy Rome

This message, intended “only” for Ambassador Reinhardt, included information for use in backgrounders for officials and journalists, but only with the Department’s consent. It included comparisons of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles, a brief discussion of possible targeting arrangements for Polaris, and the possible timing of the introduction of Polaris and the phase out of Jupiter missiles.  One point concerned “Equating of Italy and Turkey with Cuba.” U.S. officials were advised to make no comment on the matter, but if raised, officials should observe that when the Soviets equated missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Italy and Turkey “we absolutely refused accept any such comparison or deal.” A version of these points would soon go to Fanfani’s foreign policy adviser, Carlo Marchiori.

January 18, 1963

Memorandum from John W. Bowling to Francis E. Meloy, 'Jupiter Negotiations - Ankara'

Compared with the negotiations with Italy, the talks with Turkish officials were complicated and slow moving.  One problem was Foreign Minister Erkin’s “mistaken impression” that Turkey would have a role in “manning” Polaris submarines. As desk officer John Bowling observed in this memo, Ambassador Hare saw that as a “grotesque” misunderstanding of the U.S. negotiating position, and the State Department’s reply rejected proposals for any Turkish role in commanding and staffing the submarines. All the same, Bowling saw the need for some Turkish involvement, including Turkish observers on the Polaris submarines “from time to time” and a “carefully phased” program of instruction in the U.S. beginning with “familiarization training” in the Polaris weapon system.

Other complications involved the provision of F-104Gs, including Turkey’s request to increase the number of fighter-bombers in the first squadron, which Bowling wrote was “literally impossible,” and the U.S. inability to provide a delivery date for the second squadron.  He suggested that the U.S. encourage more progress with Ankara by providing information on the state of the negotiations with Italy. Optimistically, Bowling thought it “possible” to reach a “satisfactory solution in ten days or so.”

Pagination