Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Sergio Romano, writes to Foreign Minister Andreotti to dicuss the topic of the Soviet attitude towards the SDI, and the unsuccessful efforts by the Soviets to pursue a similar defense system. Even though SDI is no longer a hindrance to superpower dialogue, it would be a mistake to assume that the USSR has given up the battle against the overall missile defense system.

The document analyzes the state of East-West relations in the aftermath of the Reykjavik Summit. There appears to be an openness to continuing dialogue by both sides, but many unknowns still persist regarding Europe and the Middle East.

An analysis of the state of East-West relations. The document covers US-USSR relations, CSCE, euro-Soviet relations, and USSR internal developments.

This document analyzes East-West relations following the December 1985 meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva. It discusses the new and more open foreign policy line of the Soviet Union, and underlines the important role of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy under the complex circumstances.

The document describes the propositions put forth by Soviet negotiators during the Geneva talks, and offers a preliminary analysis of the positive and the negative implications. The developments are not sufficient to expect an accord in the short term, but show a promising move away from "a dialogue of the deaf".

A detailed evaluation of Soviet negotiation position vis-à-vis USA and Europe suggests that Moscow's willingness to agree on reductions and limitations does not meet Western needs. Gorbachev's doctrine seems to be in line with his predecessors, although increasing attention has been directed at Europe.

Andrei Gromyko forwards to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy.

Shelepin sets out a plan to discredit CIA chief Allen Dulles.

Memo concerns a directive for the discussions with US Secretary of State James Baker between May 16 and 19, 1990 in Moscow. There are also attachments concerning the quantity of warheads , cooperation, and the armed forces of the US and USSR.

In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.