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Documents

August 25, 1968

Report from Political Board of Polish Second Army

Report on the use of propaganda materials and how they have been distributed in Czech cities and villages. It also lists several incidents of hostility expressed by Czech soldiers/citizens towards Warsaw Pact soldiers.

August 26, 1968

Report from Polish Second Army’s Political Department at 7:35 hours

Report praises soldiers of the Polish Second Army for their political maturity and high spirits but says that relations between Czech citizens and soldiers of Second Army are not amicable. On August 25th, the political branch of Second Army led a propaganda operation designed for Czech society and soldiers.

August 26, 1968

Report from the Second Army's Political Department at 19:00 hours

Document continues reporting on relations between Czech citizens and Warsaw Pact armies as well as the state of Polish Second Army. Report describes propaganda dissemination in villages and cities as well as how unfriendly relations between Czech and Polish soldiers remain.

September 4, 1968

Report Regarding the Implementation of the Second Phase of Operation Danube

Chief of General Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defense General Chocha describes what steps need to be taken now that the Army is transitioning into the second phase of the "Danube" operation.

September 7, 1968

Report from the Political Department of Polish Second Army on the emotional-political condition of the soldiers taking part in Operation ‘Danube’

Report states the morale of soldiers taking part in Operation Danube is still good. But there is still no change in the unfriendly relations between Czech people and Warsaw Pact soldiers. The report describes how the Czech people are under the influence of revisionist and reactionary propaganda. It also details the conflict between Czech soldiers and Polish soldiers. It also gives an update of propaganda being broadcast through Czech radio stations.

June 6, 1979

Operational Directive from a Military Exercise Performed from June 6 to June 13, 1979

This document is a simulation of a Warsaw Pact response to a hypothetical NATO conventional attack on the GDR and the Baltic region. It provides pathways of assault with specific coordinates for naval maneuvers and specific objectives to be achieved on each day of hostilities. The United Baltic Fleet is supposed to make its way as quickly as possible to the North Sea. The ground counteroffensive first is to defend the GDR and then attack the FRG and advance along its northern coast to the border with the Netherlands and France. Other counteroffensive measures included: an amphibious landing on Bornholm and other Danish Islands, destroying aircraft carriers in the North Sea and disrupting the offshore oil platforms there. The document specifies exact villages and towns that are to be used as objectives for individual operations, and finally notes which types of units and existing divisions are supposed to participate in the counteroffensive.

April 14, 1988

Lecture by Sergei Akhromeyev, 'The Current State of Soviet Military Doctrine'

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

April 29, 1971

Information #310 KGB on PGU KGB View on a Proposal of a Warsaw Pact Intelligence Services Meeting

January 19, 1965

T. Zhivkov’s Handwritten Notes on NATO at the Warsaw Pact Meeting in Moscow

November 30, 1987

Information on the 20th Session of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense of Warsaw Pact Member States

Report on the course and results of the 20th Session of the Committee of Ministers of Defense of Warsaw Pact Member States held in Bucharest on November 24-25, 1987.

Pagination