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March 29, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. President Clinton on Friday, 26 March 1993 in Washington

During their first meeting, Kohl and Clinton examine the relevance of their joint support for Yeltsin and the need for more international financial aid for Russia agains the backdrop of the forthcoming Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in Vancouver in early April. Moreover, Kohl and Clinton discuss the relevance of intensified U.S.-German ties in the fields of culture, education and trade after the end of the Cold War.

March 5, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa on Saturday, 27 February 1993, in Tokyo

Kohl reitertates the willingess to increase Germany's global presence despite domestic issues and continuing European challenges. Kohl and Miyazawa discuss the importance of global free trade for Germany and Japan.

January 17, 1963

American Embassy Rome Telegram 1411 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

In mid-January 1963 Harvard University professor Henry Kissinger met in Rome  with senior Italian political leaders, all the way up to Fanfani and President Antonio Segni, to discuss U.S.-Italian relations, including the Jupiters.  At that point Kissinger had no official role in government, although during 1961-1962, he had been a White House consultant. According to his report to the Embassy, the Italian leadership understood “intellectually” why the U.S. wanted to remove the missiles but it was sorry that Italy was losing its “one-up” position among non-nuclear members of NATO.  (No one mentioned that Italy retained special status as a country that the U.S. had to consult before it  used nuclear weapons based there.) Segni felt some “pique” that the Jupiter decision had been made during the missile crisis and that three months had passed before his government learned of it.  “Almost everyone” believed, Kissinger told the U.S. Embassy, that there had been a U.S.-Soviet “agreement” on the Jupiter withdrawal, with the 1 April deadline seen as an important clue.

The U.S. embassy report on Kissinger’s findings arrived at the State Department the morning of 17 January 1963, with instructions for the Executive Secretariat to limit its distribution. Apparently the report, with its comments linking the Jupiters to the Cuban crisis negotiations, touched a nerve with Dean Rusk.  He instructed Assistant Secretary Tyler to inform U.S. Embassies in Europe that Kissinger had no official role, they should not help him meet high-level officials, that he did not represent the “Adm’s views,” and that “we want to discourage him,” although as a “distinguished professor” he should be “treated with courtesy and friendliness.”  Consequently Tyler drafted and sent that same day an “eyes only” telegram to U.S. ambassadors reminding them of Kissinger’s non-official status.  Rusk did not explain what Kissinger had done that irritated him, but with his interest in dispelling rumors of a secret deal, he was probably irked not only by the thinking of Italian officials but by the fact that other State Department officials, including code clerks, would see the Embassy telegram, as limited its distribution was.

March 26, 1993

Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, March 26, 1993, 10:40 - 11:55 am

Clinton and Kohl discuss German-American relations, the situation in Russia, the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute, and other international issues.

July 18, 1970

Undated, unsigned handwritten note, possibly by Minister without portfolio Israeli Galili discussing the publication of a story on Israel’s nuclear program in the New York Time

Presumably written by by Minister Israel Galili some time in 1970, this note discusses the publication of a story on Israel’s nuclear program in the New York Times. According to the note, the story mentions “the agreement we have with the President,” alluding to the 1969 Richard Nixon-Golda Meir deal on Israel’s nuclear status. The note further attempts to analyze which source within the Nixon administration had approached the paper and leaked assessments on Israel’s nuclear capabilities, underscoring the secrecy and the sensitivity surrounding the 1969 understanding.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Or Rabinowitz.

1969

Undated, unsigned handwritten note, presumably from Minister Yigal Allon to Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili

This handwritten note, presumably from Minister Yigal Allon, most likely circa 1969-1970, demonstrates how Israel adopted the NPT’s nuclear test criteria for its own purposes, allowing the Israeli leadership to maintain that Israel was not a nuclear state. Allon’s adoption of the NPT’s nuclear test criteria mirrored Israel’s official language at the time when discussing the issue with state department officials.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Ori Rabinowitz.

December 10, 1982

Excerpts of Talks between Leading Comrades and Foreign Guests (No. 12)

A Chinese Communist Party digest summarizing recent meetings held between Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Peng Zhen and foreign counterparts.

October 27, 1982

Excerpts of Talks between Leading Comrades and Foreign Guests (No. 11)

A Chinese Communist Party digest summarizing recent meetings held between Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang and Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki.

April 25, 1970

Memorandum of Conversation between Yitzak Rabin and Henry Kissinger

Rabin and. Kissinger discuss the Soviet's participation in the Egyptian Air Force, an increase in Egyptian air attacks on Israel, and potential American responses.

May 21, 1970

Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting of the NSC Special Review Group on the Middle East

Notes on an NSC Special Review Group, discussing the shift in balance and policy after the US commitment to supply aircraft to Israel.

Pagination