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April 10, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram 4136 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

A SHAPE news release would announce the “courtesy call” by the Polaris submarine, U.S.S. Sam Houston, to Iszmir, Turkey, beginning on April 14. The visit will “provide an opportunity for distinguished Turkish officials to view this latest weapon system to be assigned to the defense of Allied Command Europe.”

April 5, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram 4035 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

Walter Stoessel, Political Adviser to SACEUR General Lemnitzer, informs the State Department that Secretary of Defense McNamara has written to Turkish Minister of Defense Sancar that a Polaris submarine “on duty” in the Mediterranean would visit the port of Izmir, in compliance with Sancar’s recommendation. Sancar was also informed that, during the Polaris visit on April 14-15, “selected guests will be accommodated.”

February 16, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram NIACT POLTO 77 to Rome

Responding to the State Department proposal for a memorandum to NATO on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangements, Ambassador Thomas Finletter writes that Italian officials suggested that government approval would be expedited if the draft were “altered to become a United States memorandum” in which the Italian and Turkish representatives “simply concur.” When Finletter suggested that the proposal was not workable, the Italians responded that their government would “accept present text.” NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker did not see any serious problem, even if the substitution of Polaris for Jupiters caused “some reduction in target coverage.” Stikker asked that the U.S. “squash [the] rumor” that Polaris would be based at Rota, Spain (which was in fact the U.S. objective).

It is not clear exactly when the North Atlantic Council received this memorandum, but it may have been on February 22, 1963, the preferred date, from the State Department’s perspective, for avoiding delays in the removal of the Jupiters.

February 15, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1150 to the American Embassy Paris

To bring NATO officially on board, the State Department sent this draft paper to U.S. ambassadors in Italy, NATO, and Turkey for use with the North Atlantic Council and with SACEUR. Just as the three governments had informed the Council of the Jupiter deployment plans in the late 1950s, they would brief the NAC on the purposes of the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement and its military implications, including retargeting requirements for the “timely damage” of Allied Command Europe targets.

February 7, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1490 to the American Embassy Rome

In this overview of the state of the Jupiter/Polaris negotiations and the next steps, the State Department instructs Ambassador Hare to lead the negotiations with Turkey and to inform U.S missions that McNamara’s letter to Andreotti on the Polaris and Sergeant deployments was in the works; that Turkish “conditions” were not clear; that the U.S. and the two countries had to formally notify NATO of the “modernization” program; that bilateral agreements with Ankara and Rome on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would need to be negotiated; that steps had to be taken to prepare Polaris submarines for missions in the Mediterranean by April 1; and that the U.S. needed “considerable lead time” to prepare for the removal of the Jupiters. The negotiation of Turkey’s conditions for the Jupiter removal should not hold up notifying NATO or cause delay of the U.S.-Italy arrangements. On the use of the naval base at Rota, Spain, for stationing Polaris submarines, several NATO governments had objected (because of the Franco dictatorship), and so far Madrid had rejected U.S. proposals.

February 5, 1963

Department of State Telegram 680 to the American Embassy Ankara

The State Department remained concerned about reaching an agreement with Turkey in “principle without unfulfillable conditions of replacement Jupiter.” To move the negotiations along, this communication authorized Ambassador Hare to use as a “carrot” the Defense Department’s conditional approval of F-104 deliveries. It also advised him to avoid any “undue pressure” that could harm the negotiations.

January 29, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1416 to the American Embassy Rome

Responding to Finletter’s request, the State Department provides a statement on the Jupiters for the NAC meeting on January 30, 1963. It explained that the U.S. cannot bring up the matter unilaterally until consultations with Italy and Turkey have progressed. Finletter should coordinate delivery of the statement with Italian and Turkish representatives while Reinhard and Hare work with the Italians and Turks in preparing a written statement that can be presented to the NAC at a later stage. While the Italians were willing to join the statement, it is not clear whether Turkey did or whether the statement was made to the NAC on January 30.

January 25, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram POLTO 879 to the Seceretary of State, Washington, DC

Kennedy’s press statements and announcements by Italy and Turkey of agreements with the U.S. on the Jupiters put the U.S. Mission to NATO in an awkward position because “most NAC members learned of withdrawal of Jupiters from press.” Moreover, an internal memo to NATO’s Secretary General complained about the U.S. failure to consult with the Alliance. Ambassador Finletter here asked the Department to provide a statement that he could make to the NAC at its January 30 meeting.

August 11, 1965

Cable 786 from the US Embassy in France to the Department of State

The US Embassy in France noted that Gabon produced about 440 tons of uranium metal annually, and any diversions would occur under French, rather than Gabonese, authority.

June 11, 1964

Cable from the US Embassy in France to the Department of State, 'Franco-Israeli Nuclear Relations'

Peter Ramsbotham, chief of the chancery at the British Embassy in France, passed along information to the US Embassy about his meeting with George Soutou, a senior official at the French Foreign Ministry. While the French by then did not want Israel to acquire nuclear weapons, they believed that the Israelis were seeking them.

Pagination