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October 22, 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres on 17 October 1997, 10 a.m. - 11.15 a.m.

Kohl and Guterres look into Portugal's EC presidency and the question of EC enlargement. They agree to start formal negotiations on enlargement in early 1998 as planned. Guterres stresses that Portugal would be a major victim of enlargement as it would lose out in all areas.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

April 19, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 19 April, 13.45-13.55 hours

Kohl and Mitterrand discuss NATO's surprising decision to call for Turkish fighter aircraft in the mission to control Bosnia-Hercegovina's airspace. Both criticize the fact that the decision was taken by the military without political consultations. Both Kohl and Mitterrand believe that "this was to wrong way to bring back Turkey to the Balkans."

November 26, 1992

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with an Islamic Parliamentary Delegation led by Prof. Erbakan (Turkey) on 24 November 1992 in the Chancellor’s Office

Schmidbauer and Erbakan discuss the situation of Muslims in Western countries and in Germany in particular against the background of rising xenophobia in unified Germany. Erbakan sees Germany as a good Western partner for Muslim countries.

October 8, 1992

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran’s Vice Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki on 8 October 1992 at the Chancellor’s Office

Schmidbauer and Maleki review chances for the expansion of cooperation between Germany, Iran and the Islamic states of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, they debate the Hezbollah's involvement in the recent assassination of four Kurdish policymakers in Berlin.

June 3, 1992

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vaezi in Teheran on 2 June 1992

Schmidbauer and Vaezi search for new overtures in bilateral cooperation. They discuss the problem of German hostages in Lebanon and attacks on Iran’s embassy in Bonn.

July 4, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Secretary General of the United Nations Perez de Cuellar on Tuesday, 2 July 1991, in Bonn

Kohl and Perez de Cuellar discuss Germany's international role, European integration, the Yugoslavia War, the Middle East and the end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure as UN Secretary General.

2022

Antonio Mariani, 'The 36th Strategic Interdiction Brigade: An Italian Contribution to the Cold War' (Excerpts)

These excerpts from the memoirs of a former member of Italy’s 36th Air Brigade, published by the Italian Air Force, provides fascinating perspective on the shock felt by officers when they received the dismantling instructions and then how they planned and carried out their tasks. The following sentences convey the emotional reactions: “The dismantling, for those who experienced it, was a real demolition. A frenetic destructive activity pervaded the military community which, almost with anger and a certain sadism, destroyed and reduced to useless remains everything on which it had studied, worked and operated.” As the excerpts makes clear, not everything was destroyed and junked. Consistent with the Joint Staff’s original proposals, sensitive components, such as the warheads were returned to the U.S., while other parts of the missiles were salvaged and made available to other organizations. Some equipment went to Italy’s “San Marco” space research program, just as Prime Minister Fanfani had proposed to President Kennedy during their meeting in January 1963.

To what extent the dismantling procedure in Turkey paralleled the one in Italy remains unclear, at least on the basis of available documentation.

April 25, 1963

Note from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

In a hand-written note, McNamara reports that the last Jupiter missile in Turkey “came down yesterday” and that “The last Jupiter warhead will be flown out of Turkey on Saturday.”

April 17, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1270 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

Reporting on the visit of the Polaris submarine U.S.S. Sam Houston to Izmir, the Embassy finds it to be a “success from all points of view.” The press provided “maximum favorable coverage,” with one headline stating that the “Submarine which scares Soviets is in Izmir.” The press coverage emphasized the “power of atomic sub weapons as deterrent,” the “warmth of welcome extended to ship,” and the “importance of the dignitaries” who visited the ship.

This document is possibly an incomplete cross reference copy, and the original version was not found.

Pagination