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January 20, 1959

Code Message No. 803 from Ambassador Milnikiel in London to Winiewicz

Milnikiel writes to Winiewicz regarding a conversation between Milnikiel and British Deputy foreign secretary O’Neill. O'Neill does not think the Rapacki Plan should currently be brought up in light of the broader proposals on Germany.

November 16, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 16 November 1962

There is a belief within the US administration that Mikoyan was not successful in convincing Fidel Castro to adopt a Soviet point of view.

November 3, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

In a conversation between Drozniak and Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, Rostow compares "the initial stages of the armed conflict in Cuba to the [Japanese attacks on] Pearl Harbor [on 7 December 1941]. [He said that President] Kennedy was ready for war. The most pressing issue at the moment is a quick removal of the [Soviet] missiles from Cuba."

November 3, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

Drozniak reports on the information from several sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly the White House and State Department's reactions to the agreement to dismantle the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the continued trouble they are having with Castro's refusal to allow UN inspections.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 October 1962

Drozniak reports on information about the Cuban Missile Crisis - the US administration's opinion on Soviet missiles in Cuba, liquidating Guantanamo Base and missiles in Turkey.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 27 October 1962

Drozniak reports on his conversation with American journalist and syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop about the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."

October 25, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 25 October 1962

Drozniak discusses the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including the rumors of a possible US military invasion of Cuba.

Pagination