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March 9, 1963

Memorandum from NEA [Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Philips Talbot to G [Deputy Under State of State for Political Affairs Alexis] Johnson, 'FY 1964 MAP Levels as Basis General Wood’s Discussions in Turkey'

According to Talbot, an impasse in the impending talks between General Wood and the Turkish General Staff could have damaging implications for the removal of the Jupiters and for U.S.-Turkish relations. A key issue is the level of Military Assistance Program spending for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, with the Turks believing that they “need and deserve” a higher modernization rate than the U.S. had programmed. For the Turkish military, $120 million would represent a “sudden and catastrophic decline.” Citing the importance of keeping the military “in line,” Talbot cites Ambassador Hare’s argument that “it would be difficult to conceive a worse time for making a significant reduction in MAP” and urges Johnson to authorize Gen. Wood to start with a “base of least” $150 million.

March 8, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1060 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

The Embassy reports to the State Department that the ratification of an exchange of notes by the Grand National Assembly would not prevent the U.S. from early initiation of a “technical level” approach on dismantling the Jupiters. No “unacceptable political risks” would be involved. Turkey’s participation in the presentation to the NAC meant that “we can probably take it for granted we have final answer and proceed accordingly up to point of physical removal.”

March 7, 1963

Department of State Telegram 808 to the American Embassy Ankara

Following up on earlier ideas about direct talks with Turkish officials, General Robert Wood, the director of Military Assistance Programs at the Department of Defense, would be visiting Turkey for talks. This State Department message notes that in light of proposed overall cuts of foreign aid, projected military aid to Turkey would total $120 million, and U.S. officials would emphasize Washington’s “continuing long term interest” in Turkey’s military capabilities. Issues for Hare’s consideration include the “adequacy” of the proposed approach and what needed to be done to bolster Turkish “confidence and morale” and to prevent any “stalling” on the Jupiters.

March 6, 1963

Department of State Telegram 800 to the American Embassy Ankara

The U.S. had hoped that an exchange of notes with Turkey on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would facilitate a technical level approach to the Turkish military on the “mechanics of Jupiter dismantling.” But with parliamentary approval of the notes delayed, and not likely to occur until later in the month, the U.S. needed to make an approach on dismantling so that it occurred in conjunction with the arrival of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. With dismantling scheduled to begin on April 15, the Department would like Hare’s advice on whether a technical approach could be made “without running unacceptable political risk.”

March 3, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1030 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

Hare delivered McNamara’s response to Sancar’s letter to Erkin, who found it “very good, very constructive.” While reading it, Erkin observed that Sancar had been difficult, not for “reasons peculiar to him” but because there was a “general uneasiness” that “things may be happening which affect Turkey, but to which GOT is not privy.” That perception had an impact on Sancar’s “desire … for physical [Turkish] presence on Polaris.”

February 28, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1659 to the American Embassy Rome

The State Department sent the embassies in Ankara and Rome the text of a draft note to be used in negotiations with both countries for formal agreements on the removal of the Jupiter missiles and their replacement with Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean. The dismantlement of Jupiter sites in Italy would  “begin concurrently with the arrival of the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean” around April 1, while the dismantling in Turkey would begin with the arrival of the second Polaris submarine on or about April 15.

February 21, 1963

Memorandum from JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor to the Secretary of Defense, 'Deployment of POLARIS Submarines to the Mediterranean'

Consistent with the concerns about target coverage, the plan for Polaris patrols required the presence of at least one submarine in the Mediterranean. The overlapping patrols would begin when the U.S.S. Sam Houston entered the Mediterranean on March 28, followed by the U.S.S. John Marshall on April 10, and the U.S.S. Ethan Allen on 1 June. The Sam Houston could make a port call in Turkey, but the stopover had to occur when another submarine was in the Mediterranean. Taylor recommended the port of Glock as the site of a two-day visit, one day for a visit by officials and the second for a “daylight indoctrination cruise by designated observers.” The latter would be barred from sensitive “spaces” used for communications and nuclear propulsion.

February 18, 1963

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 970 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

A number of issues raised by Defense Minister Sancar about the Jupiter agreement were unresolved. While some in the Turkish government wanted to withdraw Sancar’s letter to McNamara, President İnönü was reluctant to do that, wanting it understood that what Sancar had written “were not conditions but rather expression of Turkish needs and desires.” During a meeting, Foreign Minister Erkin told Hare that he was trying to clear the proposed memorandum to the NAC in time for its meeting on February 20. On the sentence about Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean, Erkin suggested this wording: Polaris was being “especially assigned” to Italy and Turkey. That would speak to the “Turkish feeling” that “Polaris has remoteness which lessens its appeal.”

Later that day, Hare wrote that the Turkish government was apparently willing to sign on to the statement to NATO. That Turkey had already made the “political decision” to dismantle the Jupiters made it necessary for the U.S. to address Sancar’s concerns, such as the nuclear weapons for the F-100s, the delivery of a third F-104 squadron, access to the facilities at Cigli, and Turkey’s role in the Polaris submarines. Hare also favored a positive response to Sancar’s proposal for negotiations between U.S. and Turkish representatives.

February 16, 1963

American Embassy Paris Telegram NIACT POLTO 77 to Rome

Responding to the State Department proposal for a memorandum to NATO on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangements, Ambassador Thomas Finletter writes that Italian officials suggested that government approval would be expedited if the draft were “altered to become a United States memorandum” in which the Italian and Turkish representatives “simply concur.” When Finletter suggested that the proposal was not workable, the Italians responded that their government would “accept present text.” NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker did not see any serious problem, even if the substitution of Polaris for Jupiters caused “some reduction in target coverage.” Stikker asked that the U.S. “squash [the] rumor” that Polaris would be based at Rota, Spain (which was in fact the U.S. objective).

It is not clear exactly when the North Atlantic Council received this memorandum, but it may have been on February 22, 1963, the preferred date, from the State Department’s perspective, for avoiding delays in the removal of the Jupiters.

February 15, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1150 to the American Embassy Paris

To bring NATO officially on board, the State Department sent this draft paper to U.S. ambassadors in Italy, NATO, and Turkey for use with the North Atlantic Council and with SACEUR. Just as the three governments had informed the Council of the Jupiter deployment plans in the late 1950s, they would brief the NAC on the purposes of the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement and its military implications, including retargeting requirements for the “timely damage” of Allied Command Europe targets.