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Documents

March 7, 1968

Record of Conversation between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu on 7 March 1968

A record of a conversation in which Brezhnev and Ceausescu discuss weather or not to say that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will only be signed once the United States ends its actions in Vietnam. Brezhnev advises not to raise the issue, while Ceausescu claims that it must be stated in order to advance a solution towards disarmament.

March 6, 1968

Record of Conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu on 6 March 1968

Brezhnev starts the conversation by asking if Ceausescu is in agreement about supporting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.  Ceausescu responds by saying that the draft could still improve by including a guarantee that countries without nuclear weapons will not be attacked by nuclear states and clarifying controls over nuclear weapon production.

March 17, 1967

Record of Conversations between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu, 17 March 1967

Brezhnev and Ceausescu begin by extending warm welcomes to one another before diving into the importance of finalizing a draft of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Most of the discussion is spent arguing over the relevance of disarmament within the treaty.

March 18, 1967

Record of Conversations between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu, 18 March 1967

Brezhnev and Ceausescu discuss draft versions of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, arguing about the language used in the deal. They also discuss the creation of an intergovernmental conference of European countries and agree that they should meet more often in the future.

February 26, 1971

From the Journal of M.G. Podol’sky, 'Record of a Conversation with R. Berthold, Counsellor of the GDR Embassy in Hanoi, 18 February 1971'

A Soviet official in Vietnam recounts a meeting with an East German diplomat. The two sides discussed the nuclear threats from the United States in the Vietnam War, as well as relations with China.

June 3, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Situation in China (Student Demonstrations)'

The document from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals Japanese Embassy personnel observations of the events that took place in Xinjuamen and Xidan on the afternoon of June 3, 1989 following the Tiananmen Square incident. It also references Premier Li Peng and Defense Minister Qin Jeiwei’s response following the events.

June 20, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Chinese Student Movement (After Armed Suppression by the Military)'

Report from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the subsequent actions of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada.

June 3, 1989

Television News in Beijing at 7 o'clock in the Evening, June 3

Summary of the announcements of martial law in Beijing.

June 4, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'Use of Force by Chinese Martial Law Forces (Questions and Answers)'

Report from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 4, 1989 detailing Japan’s response to the use of force by Chinese martial law forces following the Tiananmen Square incident.

June 4, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Chinese Student Demonstrations (Part 2)'

The document, written on June 4, 1989 and submitted by the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan, lists the facts surrounding Beijing’s use of martial law authorities and military force during the Tiananmen Square incident on June 3, 1989. It details the background leading up to the imposition of the martial law, power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party, lateness in bringing the situation under control, and struggle for democratization and liberalization. It also indicates the impact of the Tiananmen Square incident and the CCP’s response as it pertains to the Party’s prestige and international image.

Pagination