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June 26, 1959

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin)

Boland gauged opinion at the UN and assisted in preparing the ground for Aiken’s campaign in the XIVth Session in the fall of 1959. Ireland cultivated the UN Secretariat, notably Dr. Protitch, who evaluated the Irish proposal as helpful. Likewise, intimations from the Eastern bloc were positive. The Irish Permanent Representative consolidated links with the second-in-command of the U.S. mission to the UN, James W. Barco, to enable a constructive dialogue with the Americans to fashion a resolution they could tolerate

November 20, 1958

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin) (Private and Confidential), New York

The report of Ireland’s permanent representative to the United Nations to his superior, the secretary of the Department of External Affairs, delivers his account of Aiken’s first (failed) attempt to generate support for a resolution in the Thirteenth UN Session. Recognizing the breadth and depth of opposition, he withdrew his draft resolution and instead requested a simple roll call vote in favor of the second paragraph on 31 October – a modest statement acknowledging that an expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states would be harmful to peace and increase obstacles to disarmament. The measure passed with 37 votes and no opposition, although 44 abstentions were recorded. The Soviet bloc supported the maneuver, while Western-aligned countries abstained.  

October 17, 1958

Press Release containing a Speech by Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken and Draft Resolutions on Nuclear Disarmament

Aiken’s first step was a modest paragraph calling for the formation of a UN commission to recommend measures to the next session. However, global attentions were focused on nuclear tests and their health effects, so Aiken linked his initiative with the American-led seventeen-power resolution requesting all states to suspend testing voluntarily. Aiken proposed an amendment to that motion that included the notion of brokering an understanding between nuclear weapons powers and non-nuclear powers.  He submitted that the former voluntarily desist from supplying nuclear weapons to other countries, while non-nuclear powers reciprocated and volunteered not to develop such weapons during a test suspension. This proposed quid pro quo became a staple in the Irish resolutions subsequently and eventually be inscribed into the NPT.

Aiken’s speech invoked recognizable tropes such as a ‘geometric’ increase in nuclear powers, creating an urgent need to halt the spread. His speech was seminal in identifying themes he and international opinion would rehearse in future years. He conjured up fears about small states and revolutionary groups with a bomb acting as ‘the detonator for world-wide thermonuclear war’. Aiken was perceptive – he expected criticisms about institutionalized equality between states (nuclear “haves” and “have nots”), harms to alliances, the sufficiency of test bans, and the absence of monitoring. He sought to disprove the validity of such critiques, and these issues were worked through gradually, eventually leading to the finalization of the NPT ten years later.  

September 19, 1958

Address by Mr. Frank Aiken to the United Nations General Assembly Official, 23th Session, 751st Plenary Meeting

Aiken’s landmark address to the plenary of the UN General Assembly on 19 September 1958 launched his non-proliferation campaign. It is the first time he publicly identified stopping the spread of nuclear weapons as a concrete step in the collective interest to unblock the disarmament impasse, preventing as runaway arms race among the powers of the Earth. It was clearly framed as part of his wider campaign for global governance based on the rule of law rather than the threat of force. For Aiken, the challenge was stabilizing the arms race and generating trust to construct a world order based on justice and law – “to preserve a Pax Atomica while we build a Pax Mundi.” This speech was a critical departure. The widespread positive reception encouraged Aiken, persuading him to draft a formal resolution.

December 12, 1957

Confidential Report from Thomas J. Kieran (Ottawa) to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Poland and our Policy at U.N.O.’

There was value in Aiken’s advocacy for Ireland to take an independent position in constructing broad-based international support for change. Aiken acted as a potent bridgebuilder between the Western and Eastern camps and also between the Cold War blocs and nonaligned countries. Ireland’s democratic heritage, neutrality and anti-colonial history appealed to many constituencies, not least in Africa and Asia. Even its anti-Communist ideological orientation failed to deter admirers in the Eastern bloc, as they recognized that Aiken was sincere in seeking to propose fresh solutions and reduce international tension. An example of the positive feedback and encouragement that Aiken received is displayed in the attached Irish record of the Polish response.

October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

August 25, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Croatia’s President Tudjman on 25 August 1995 at 09.20 hours

Kohl emphasizes the need for a peaceful liberation of Eastern Croatia. Kohl urgently asks Tudjman to look into Croatian war crimes and human rights violations himself. Kohl wants Tudjman "to enforce discipline in the cases where the allegations were justified and penalize the people that had committed crimes."

August 18, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 18 August 1995, 13.00 hours

Kohl and Major discuss the impact of the war in former Yugolavia on the Muslim world, the European Community and domestic U.S. policy. Both agree that there was a window of opportunity for a settlement before the winter.

July 20, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin on 20 July at 12.00 hours

Kohl wants Yeltsin to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into concession. Kohl's request for Yeltsin is to become engaged personally in such an effort.

July 20, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Yugoslavia Mediator Carl Bildt on 20 July 1995, 12.45 hours

Kohl and Bildt analyze the situation in former Yugoslavia and agree that the key NATO states were not willing to start  a war including hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Kohl says it was out the question for him to send German soldiers waging war in the Balkans.

Pagination