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January 17, 1963

Minute of Understanding [between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fanfani]

The two leaders signed off on a “minute of understanding” expressing their understanding on the MLF, replacement of Jupiters with Polaris by April 1, the substitution of Sergeant for Corporal missiles, and the possibility of using the Jupiters for “space experiments.” In accordance with Fanfani’s request, the minute was retyped to leave out the reference to bases in the Mediterranean.

January 16, 1963

Memorandum to the Secretary of State [Dean Rusk] from McGeorge Bundy

During the luncheon for Fanfani, Bundy sent Rusk this short memo about the Fanfani-Kennedy conversation, noting the former’s concern that removing the Jupiters could lead to attacks from the right about “softness toward left-wingers who want the missiles out.” When Kennedy spoke with McNamara after the meeting, he asked him to emphasize to Fanfani the military advantages of replacing the Jupiters with Polaris. McNamara wanted to emphasize that very point to offset any talk of a “nefarious Cuban bargain” with the Soviets. Bundy also highlighted the debate between George Ball and McNamara over whether Jupiters and Polaris should be mentioned in the communique on the Fanfani-Kennedy discussions.

January 16, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between Aminitore Fanfani, Prime Minister of the Italian Republic, and the President [John F. Kenndy], 'Modernization of Nuclear Missiles in Italy and the Miditerranean'

Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani’s visit to the U.S. was an opportunity for he and President Kennedy to reach “a meeting of the minds” on the Jupiter-Polaris problem. The two had several conversations during the next two days on East-West relations, NATO nuclear issues, and the developing world, among other topics.  During this conversation, with only the U.S. translator present, Kennedy explained to Fanfani that Polaris/Sergeant missiles as a replacement for Jupiter/Corporals, along with Italian participation in an eventual MLF, should be announced as “whole package” rather than to have “the different points of decision simply leak out, without coherence and possibly at the wrong moment.” He believed that the main elements of the agreement would find “general approval” among most political groupings in Italy. When Fanfani brought up the possibility of announcing the U.S. request on Jupiters and Polaris and then taking it to his government, Kennedy emphasized the need for quick action, adding that it would “not be desirable to allow for prolonged discussion” of the package.

At Fanfani’s request, Kennedy explained the arrangements for Polaris missions in the Mediterranean, which operated out of a base in the Iberian Peninsula (Rota, Spain), and the various options for an MLF, either surface or submarine ships. Such an approach, Kennedy believed, was a way to improve the “position of the West.” Accepting Kennedy’s assertions about the dangers of the Jupiter missiles, Fanfani nevertheless saw a “psychological” problem involving the “prestige and strength” of Italy’s armed forces. Kennedy “indicated lively interest” in Fanfani’s question as to whether the Jupiter bases could be used for “cooperative peaceful space efforts.”

At the meeting’s conclusion, Kennedy “stressed that by the following morning they should be able to combine four or five points into a proposal that would strengthen the Italian and American position within the framework of the Alliance, thus making this meeting a gain in its cohesiveness and hence political strength.”

January 3, 1963

Steering Group on Implementing the Nassau Decisions, 'Minutes of 2nd Meeting Held January 3, 1963, at 5:00 P.M.'

The Nassau Steering Group devoted its January 3, 1963, session to Jupiter removal diplomacy. Ambassadors Finletter, Hare and Reinhardt were present as well as McGeorge Bundy and Defense Department General Counsel John McNaughton. While the papers on the Jupiter that the committee prepared remain classified, the discussion summarized here covered some of the key issues. One was to avoid the word “withdrawal” when discussing the Jupiters and to use the word “replace” instead, as in replace Jupiters with Polaris SLBMs. Moreover, because of concern about leaks, there would be no reference to an April 1, 1963, deadline  in communications with the Italians and Turks. As April 1 would be six months after the Cuban crisis, State Department official Seymour Weiss wanted to “go to the mat” to keep any dates out of the official discussions because he worried that too much specificity would raise suspicions of a “deal” or would sound like an “ultimatum.”  Nevertheless, an April 1 date would be used for the timing of the stationing of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean and some U.S. interlocuters would see it as a deadline.

The Steering Group also addressed the problems raised by the early deployment to Turkey of F-104Gs; making the fighter-bombers available by May 1963 would require the rerouting of planes that had already been assigned to the Republic of China (Taiwan), Denmark, Norway, and Greece. There would be a delay in deploying nuclear bombs for the F-104s until they were outfitted with Permissive Action Links (PALs), as required by President Kennedy, which was not likely to occur until later in the year.

December 13, 1962

McGeorge Bundy, 'Last Conversation with the President before NATO Meeting of December 1962'

Kennedy, McNamara and Rusk moved ahead with the Jupiters matter by making plans to bring it up with Italian and Turkish defense ministers at the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1962. The goal would be to persuade them of the obsolescence of the Jupiters, the dangers that they posed during the Cuban crisis and in future crises, and the need for “better arrangements,” such as “a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.”

President Kennedy continued to monitor the Jupiter missiles problem. During a meeting with Rusk a few weeks later, McNamara explained that President Kennedy, who he had seen in Palm Beach on December 27, had asked him what steps were being taken “to remove the Jupiters.” Consistent with that, McNamara favored the “earliest possible date” and asked whether a “deadline” could be set for April 1 to begin the removals.

May 7, 1963

National Security Action Memorandum 241, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant' with Attachment 'France'

A report about an alleged French request to West Germany for financial support for their Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant raised White House hackles, despite German and French disavowals. In this memorandum, McGeorge Bundy asked the CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] to investigate the report and the State Department to develop policy recommendations in light of the findings.

February 27, 1963

President Kennedy to Honorable William Tyler [Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs] and Honorable Paul Nitze [Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs]

In a memorandum to senior officials at the Departments of Defense and State, President Kennedy expressed doubts over whether West Germany would abide by the non-nuclear weapons commitment that West German Chancellor Adenauer had made in 1954. Also mentioned in the memorandum is Kennedy's description of a meeting with West German defense minister Kai-Uwe von Hassell to discuss these concerns; von Hassell assured the President that West Germany would not go on any "nuclear adventures."

November 27, 1962

Secretary of State to the President, 'Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons,' with Enclosures and Cover Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy

In this proposed agreement, Secretary of State Rusk asked the White House for authorization to approach the Soviets. Rusk had two central goals in mind: to determine if the Soviets would state whether its allies, such as China, would agree to a nonproliferation agreement and to give Moscow a “somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons.”

May 18, 1961

Memorandum, by L.D. Battle, Executive Secretary, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'American Scientists’ Visit to Israel’s Dimona Reactor'

President Kennedy told the new US ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, that he was concerned about Israel’s insistence on a secret visit as well as the "absence of a 'neutral' scientist" in the visit to Dimona. The State Department took the position that it was better to put up with Ben-Gurion’s "sensitivities" about secrecy than "have no visit" at all

November 23, 1965

Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to National Security Adviser McGeorge, Bundy, enclosing summary of 'Nth Country Evaluation'

Summary of Union Carbide’s 1964 study on gas centrifuge technology’s effect on nuclear proliferation. The summary provides Union Carbide’s estimations for how long countries of varying industrial capability would take to develop a nuclear weapon, which was redacted in the original document.

Pagination