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October 31, 1997	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with British PM Blair on 20 October 1997, 10.30 a.m. - 3 p.m. in Chequers Kohl and Blair examine Britain's role in Europe. They discuss European Economic and Monetary Union, European aerospace industry, the agenda 2000 for Europe, EC enlargement and the convocation of the G-8 summit in Birmingham in 1998.
October 22, 1997	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres on 17 October 1997, 10 a.m. - 11.15 a.m. Kohl and Guterres look into Portugal's EC presidency and the question of EC enlargement. They agree to start formal negotiations on enlargement in early 1998 as planned. Guterres stresses that Portugal would be a major victim of enlargement as it would lose out in all areas.
July 30, 1997	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Madrid on 8 July 1997 Kohl and Kuchma debate plans for the establishment of a permanent German-Ukrainian commission. Kohl emphasizes Ukraine's relevance in terms of European security.
May 12, 1997	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev on Saturday, 10 May 1997, 2.30 p.m. - 3.45 p.m. in Almaty Kohl and Nazarbaev dissus a variety of issues including Russia, China, NATO enlargement and the domestic situation in Iran against the backdrop of the end of Rafsandjani's tenure in 1997. Kohl reiterates his willingness to engage Iran. At the same time, he stresses the need for Iran to move first in order to show goodwill.
April 23, 1997	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin on 17 April 1997 in Baden-Baden Kohl and Yeltsin talk about the convocation of regular German-Russian summits including their relevant ministers. They review Yeltsin's meeting with Clinton in Helsinki on NATO enlargmement in March 1997 when Yeltsin gave his consent to the conclusion of a NATO-Russia partnership treaty based on the condition that NATO would not deploy nuclear armaments and permanent conventional forces in its new member states. Kohl points to the long-term perspective and the importance of concluding the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
September 12, 1996	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Polish President Kwasniewski on Thursday, 12 September 1996, 9.30 hours Kohl and Kwasniewski exchange thoughts on the state of Yeltsin's health. They agree that NATO must not pursue further steps in the enlargement process during the period of Yeltsin's illness after his coronary bypass surgery. Finally, Kohl and Kwasniewski look into the timetable for NATO enlargement and the decision about its new members at the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid.
February 26, 1996	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meetings with President Yeltsin in Moscow (18 - 20 February 1996) here: Chancellor’s Conversation with President Yeltsin on 19 February 1996 Kohl and Yeltsin discuss the need for an end to the war in Chechnya prior to the 1996 Presidential election in Russia. Yeltsin criticizes the sharp position of the German media in terms of the Chechnya War. With regards to NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia partnership, Kohl and Yeltsin agree to search for a solution after the Russian Presidential election.
February 22, 1996	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on 19 February 1996 in Moscow (16.45 - 17.30 hours) Kohl and Primakov debate NATO enlargement. Primakov reiterates the broad societal consensus against NATO enlargement in Russia. Kohl stresses that there was Western agreement in terms of the need for Russia's continued inclusion in international affairs.
January 10, 1996	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the President of the Polish Republic, Mister Alexander Kwasniewski on 9 January 1996 at the Chancellor’s Office Kohl refers to the Franco-German relationship as a role model for Germany’s relationship with Poland. Kwasniewski looks into Poland's domestic reform agenda stressing the importance of further expanding Poland's ties with NATO and the EC.
October 4, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Iran’s President Rafsanjani on 2 October 1995 at 16.25 hours Kohl and Rafsanjani discuss the relevance of Bosnia and Hercegovina as a key issue for the Muslim world. In addition, they talk about a new major German credit for Iran.
March 14, 1961	Memorandum to All Missions by the Department of External Affairs, ‘Arms Control’ (Confidential) (408/264B), Dublin The arrival of the new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, in office in 1961 encouraged Aiken to redouble his efforts. He searched for signs of change in the Kennedy administration. He was nevertheless guarded, appreciating that the arms control ambitions of the United States did not necessarily or completely align with Ireland’s disarmament aspirations. He understood that progress required educating public opinion to recognize that general and complete disarmament could, given the vested interests, take generations. A step-by-step, gradualist approach therefore had to be adopted. He reiterated his philosophy of expanding areas of law, adopting a regionalist approach, and assuming a preventive orientation in a commentary on Kennedy’s article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in November 1960, which was itself based on Kennedy's campaign speech earlier that year.
July 7, 1959	Dáil Éireann Debate, Tuesday 7 July 1959, Committee on Finance - Vote 59--External Affairs [Excerpt] New Taoiseach Seán Lemass took the unusual step of intervening in a Foreign Affairs debate in July 1959 to defend Frank Aiken’s conduct at the United Nations. Trenchant critics on the opposition benches in the Fine Gael party had berated Aiken repeatedly since 1957. Critics inside and outside of the lower house of parliament (Dáil Éireann) asserted that Ireland, “a tiny country” with limited interests, had no right to voice an opinion on global matters which was more appropriately dealt with by the “Great Powers.” Worse, Aiken’s interventions would create enemies among Irish friends worldwide, most notably in the United Sstates. The tenor of the arguments was that Ireland had no nuclear energy industry and no nuclear weapons aspirations, so such matters should be left to the nuclear powers. It is difficult to avoid the sense that elements in Irish political life appreciated that American and NATO nuclear forces informally protected the anti-communist Republic of Ireland. Lemass ended speculation that he was less of a supporter of Aiken than his predecessor, de Valera. He affirmed that Ireland had a significant contribution to make to the global commons in terms of reinforcing peace and order. Aiken was empowered to continue.
July 14, 1959	Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington) First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry.
June 26, 1959	Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin) Boland gauged opinion at the UN and assisted in preparing the ground for Aiken’s campaign in the XIVth Session in the fall of 1959. Ireland cultivated the UN Secretariat, notably Dr. Protitch, who evaluated the Irish proposal as helpful. Likewise, intimations from the Eastern bloc were positive. The Irish Permanent Representative consolidated links with the second-in-command of the U.S. mission to the UN, James W. Barco, to enable a constructive dialogue with the Americans to fashion a resolution they could tolerate
November 20, 1958	Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin) (Private and Confidential), New York The report of Ireland’s permanent representative to the United Nations to his superior, the secretary of the Department of External Affairs, delivers his account of Aiken’s first (failed) attempt to generate support for a resolution in the Thirteenth UN Session. Recognizing the breadth and depth of opposition, he withdrew his draft resolution and instead requested a simple roll call vote in favor of the second paragraph on 31 October – a modest statement acknowledging that an expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states would be harmful to peace and increase obstacles to disarmament. The measure passed with 37 votes and no opposition, although 44 abstentions were recorded. The Soviet bloc supported the maneuver, while Western-aligned countries abstained.
October 17, 1958	Press Release containing a Speech by Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken and Draft Resolutions on Nuclear Disarmament Aiken’s first step was a modest paragraph calling for the formation of a UN commission to recommend measures to the next session. However, global attentions were focused on nuclear tests and their health effects, so Aiken linked his initiative with the American-led seventeen-power resolution requesting all states to suspend testing voluntarily. Aiken proposed an amendment to that motion that included the notion of brokering an understanding between nuclear weapons powers and non-nuclear powers. He submitted that the former voluntarily desist from supplying nuclear weapons to other countries, while non-nuclear powers reciprocated and volunteered not to develop such weapons during a test suspension. This proposed quid pro quo became a staple in the Irish resolutions subsequently and eventually be inscribed into the NPT. Aiken’s speech invoked recognizable tropes such as a ‘geometric’ increase in nuclear powers, creating an urgent need to halt the spread. His speech was seminal in identifying themes he and international opinion would rehearse in future years. He conjured up fears about small states and revolutionary groups with a bomb acting as ‘the detonator for world-wide thermonuclear war’. Aiken was perceptive – he expected criticisms about institutionalized equality between states (nuclear “haves” and “have nots”), harms to alliances, the sufficiency of test bans, and the absence of monitoring. He sought to disprove the validity of such critiques, and these issues were worked through gradually, eventually leading to the finalization of the NPT ten years later.
September 19, 1958	Address by Mr. Frank Aiken to the United Nations General Assembly Official, 23th Session, 751st Plenary Meeting Aiken’s landmark address to the plenary of the UN General Assembly on 19 September 1958 launched his non-proliferation campaign. It is the first time he publicly identified stopping the spread of nuclear weapons as a concrete step in the collective interest to unblock the disarmament impasse, preventing a runaway arms race among the powers of the Earth. It was clearly framed as part of his wider campaign for global governance based on the rule of law rather than the threat of force. For Aiken, the challenge was stabilizing the arms race and generating trust to construct a world order based on justice and law – “to preserve a Pax Atomica while we build a Pax Mundi.” This speech was a critical departure. The widespread positive reception encouraged Aiken, persuading him to draft a formal resolution.
December 12, 1957	Confidential Report from Thomas J. Kieran (Ottawa) to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Poland and our Policy at U.N.O.’ There was value in Aiken’s advocacy for Ireland to take an independent position in constructing broad-based international support for change. Aiken acted as a potent bridgebuilder between the Western and Eastern camps and also between the Cold War blocs and nonaligned countries. Ireland’s democratic heritage, neutrality and anti-colonial history appealed to many constituencies, not least in Africa and Asia. Even its anti-Communist ideological orientation failed to deter admirers in the Eastern bloc, as they recognized that Aiken was sincere in seeking to propose fresh solutions and reduce international tension. An example of the positive feedback and encouragement that Aiken received is displayed in the attached Irish record of the Polish response.
October 2, 1957	Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach] Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.
August 25, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Croatia’s President Tudjman on 25 August 1995 at 09.20 hours Kohl emphasizes the need for a peaceful liberation of Eastern Croatia. Kohl urgently asks Tudjman to look into Croatian war crimes and human rights violations himself. Kohl wants Tudjman "to enforce discipline in the cases where the allegations were justified and penalize the people that had committed crimes."
August 18, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 18 August 1995, 13.00 hours Kohl and Major discuss the impact of the war in former Yugoslavia on the Muslim world, the European Community and domestic U.S. policy. Both agree that there was a window of opportunity for a settlement before the winter.
July 20, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin on 20 July at 12.00 hours Kohl wants Yeltsin to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into concession. Kohl's request for Yeltsin is to become engaged personally in such an effort.
July 20, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Yugoslavia Mediator Carl Bildt on 20 July 1995, 12.45 hours Kohl and Bildt analyze the situation in former Yugoslavia and agree that the key NATO states were not willing to start a war including hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Kohl says it was out the question for him to send German soldiers waging war in the Balkans.
July 18, 1995	Memorandum: Situation in former Yugoslavia, here: The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 17 July 1995 Kohl and Major discuss the situation in former Yugoslavia and the need to draw a red line to stop Serbian attacks in the Bosnian war. Both emphasize a potential change in NATO's posture moving from a a peace keeping operation toward a peace enforcing position entailing the possibility of full-fledged war against the Bosnian Serbs.
May 11, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on 9 May 1995 in Moscow Kohl and Yeltsin discucss the parallelism between NATO enlargement and Russia's engagement and the timing of NATO enlargement in particular. Yeltsin expresses his disappointment about the lack of progress in the U.S.-Russian talks on the issue complaining that the "the West was about to relapse into the thinking of military blocs prior to 1990. This was not acceptable," Yeltsin says. Moreover, Kohl and Yeltsin discuss Russian sales of nuclear power plants for Iran.
March 31, 1995	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Polish President Walesa in Copenhagen on 11 March 1995 Kohl and Walesa examine the state of NATO enlargement and EC enlargement. Walesa sees EC enlargment first and foremost as an economic process that would take longer. The decision for NATO enlargement could be taken faster, Walesa argues. Kohl reiterates the necessity of a "face-saving" solution for Russia short of giving Russia a veto over NATO enlargement.
August 30, 1994	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with King Hussein Bin Talal of Jordan on 29 August 1994 at the Chancellor’s Office, 16.30 hours until 17.50 hours Kohl and King Hussein look into the situation in the Middle East and in Northern Africa. They focus on on the situation in the individual countries of the Middle East, the perspectives of the peace process in the region and the bilateral relationship between Germany and Jordan.
July 5, 1994	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, on 4 July 1994 from 9.55 to 11.05 a.m. at the Federal Chancellery Kohl and Li Peng discuss human rights in China and the Chinese interpretation of the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre of 1989. Moreover, they review the relationship between the Vatican and China, German policy on Taiwan, China and GATT, China and the USA as well as EC trade restrictions vis-à-vis China.
June 14, 1994	State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati on 13 June 1994 at the Chancellor’s Office Schmidbauer and Velayati discuss the release of a German prisoner in Iran as a precondition for Germany's support of Iran's request for closer association with the European Community.
May 13, 1994	Memorandum: President Yeltsin's Visit in Bonn, here: Delegation Meeting on 11 May at the Chancellor’s Office Kohl and Yeltsin examine the state of bilateral relations on a number of issues including trade, culture and military-to-military contacts.
May 1994	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Iran's President Rafsanjani on 6 May, 13.30 - 13.43 hours Rafsandjani expresses his gratitude for Kohl's concessions with regards to the debt rescheduling agreement with Iran. Moreover, they discuss the fate of Bosnian Muslims, Foreign Minsiter Velayati's forthcoming visit in Bonn and the release of a German prisoner in Iran.
February 28, 1994	State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran's Vice Foreign Minister Vaezi on 25 February 1994 at the Chancellor's Office Schmidtbauer and Vaezi discuss the state of bilateral negotiatins on debt rescheduling as well as Iran's aspirations for closer contacts with the European Community. Vaezi asks for support during Germany's EC Presidency in the second half of 1995. Schmidbauer insists on the release of a German prisoner in Iran as a gesture of goodwill.
February 18, 1994	Meeting between Head of Department 2 [Joachim Bitterlich] and Iranian Ambassador Mousavian on 17 February 1994 Bitterlich and Mousavian review the state of bilateral relations and the importance of debt rescheduling for Iran. Bitterlich requests a more constructive Iranian role in the search for peace in the Middle East. Both discuss schemes for regional security and the CSCE process as a role model for the establishment of new multilateral security institutions in the Middle East.
February 12, 1994	Cable, Secretary of State to US Office Berlin (Eyes Only for Ambassador Holbrooke), 'Memcon of Clinton-Kohl January 31 Lunch' A U.S. summary of a meeting between Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl.
February 3, 1994	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Lunch Meeting with President Clinton in Washington on 31 January 1994 Kohl and Clinton review the state of NATO enlargement after the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. They view NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the best solution to engage Russia and to reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Both view the situation in Ukraine as a key factor in the search for Europe's post-Cold War order. "If anything happened in Ukraine, this would increase the pressure for the NATO accession of the Central and Eastern European countries," Clinton says.
January 19, 1994	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 18 January 1994 Kohl and Clinton review the recently concluded trilateral agreement on Ukraine's denuclearization and Clinton's contacts with Yeltsin and Ukraine's President Kravchuk.
September 29, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin on 29 September 1993 at 8.30 hours Kohl and Yeltsin debate the situation in Russia after end of the constitutional crisis.
September 9, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 7 September 1993 Kohl and Clinton discuss plans for NATO enlargement and the need to find a modus vivendi for an intermediate period as a way to balance Russia's engagement and the security interests of the Central and East European countries. Kohl has doubts over the feasibility of NATO enlargement but is willing to search for an intermediary solution.
January 21, 1991	Cable, Richard Armitage to the White House for Mr. Robert Gates, 'Hussein/Armitage Meeting January 21, 1991' The President’s special envoy to Jordan, Richard Armitage, updates the White House on a private talk he had just had with King Hussein. The King briefed Armitage on a secret meeting recently held with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.
May 12, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on 11 May 1993 17.30-17.40 hours Kohl's request for Yeltsin is to put more political pressure on the Bosnian Serbs.
May 12, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with ANC Chairman Nelson Mandela on Monday, 10 May 1993 Kohl and Mandela review the situation in South Africa after the end of Apartheid analyzing conflicts between the Inkatha and the ANC. Mandela asks for Germany's financial assistance. Kohl agrees to review the request as long as Mandela himself was his interlocator on financial support for the ANC.
May 7, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Christopher on Thursday, 6 May 1993 Kohl and Christopher discuss various scenarios in the search for peace in former Yugoslavia after the failure of the Vance/Owen plan. They debate whether Russia would perhaps accept a lifting of the arms embargo for the Muslims in Bosnia. Moreover, they discuss the state of Germany's domestic debate on out-of-area missions.
April 29, 1993	State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with the Chairman of Iran's Foreign Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee and Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Mister Hassan Rouhani, on 29 April 1993 in Bonn Schmidbauer and Rouhani review the state of bilateral relations. They discuss Iran's arms control policy and its interest in the aquisitation of nuclear technology for peaceful uses, as Rouhani argues. Rouhani reiterates Iran's readiness for whatever kind of international nuclear inspections. Iran's interest was still the finalization of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
April 30, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin on 29 April 1993 at 15.00 hours Kohl and Yeltsin review the results of the referendum on the Russian constitution and its implications for Yeltsin's future relationship with the parliament.
April 27, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Czech President Havel on Montag, 26 April 1993 Kohl and Havel talk about the Czech desire to join NATO. Havel emphasizes his concern about the security vaccum in Central and Eastern Europe. He argues in favor of Czech association with NATO as a way to enhance security and stability in Europe. Havel also expresses concern about NATO's reluctance to consider this. Kohl gives an evasive response.
April 19, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 19 April, 13.45-13.55 hours Kohl and Mitterrand discuss NATO's surprising decision to call for Turkish fighter aircraft in the mission to control Bosnia-Hercegovina's airspace. Both criticize the fact that the decision was taken by the military without political consultations. Both Kohl and Mitterrand believe that "this was to wrong way to bring back Turkey to the Balkans."
March 31, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak in Bonn on 30 March 1993, 15.30-17.20 hours Kohl and Mubarak discuss the recent bomb attack in Cairo and the question of the assassins. Upon Kohl's question, Mubarak rejects the idea that Libya and Gaddafi could be behind it. Rather, Mubarak suggests the changes in Gaddafi’s position and the latter's concern about fundamentalist terror in Libya. Mubarak thinks Iran was behind the terror attack in Cairo.
March 29, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. President Clinton on Friday, 26 March 1993 in Washington During their first meeting, Kohl and Clinton examine the relevance of their joint support for Yeltsin and the need for more international financial aid for Russia agains the backdrop of the forthcoming Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in Vancouver in early April. Moreover, Kohl and Clinton discuss the relevance of intensified U.S.-German ties in the fields of culture, education and trade after the end of the Cold War.
March 19, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Thursday, 18 March 1993 Mitterrand gives a report on his recent meeting with Yeltsin emphasizing his support for the idea to have a multilateral Western summit meeting on financial aid for Russia prior to the 1993 Tokyo World Economic Summit as a way to show more support for Yeltsin. Kohl and Mitterrand discuss British and Japanese objections to this idea.
March 15, 1993	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 15 March 1993 Kohl and Mitterrand review the latter's meeting with Milosevic in Paris and the lack of results in the French dialogue with the Serbian leadership.

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Results:

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Documents

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with British PM Blair on 20 October 1997, 10.30 a.m. - 3 p.m. in Chequers

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres on 17 October 1997, 10 a.m. - 11.15 a.m.

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Madrid on 8 July 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev on Saturday, 10 May 1997, 2.30 p.m. - 3.45 p.m. in Almaty

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin on 17 April 1997 in Baden-Baden

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Polish President Kwasniewski on Thursday, 12 September 1996, 9.30 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meetings with President Yeltsin in Moscow (18 - 20 February 1996) here: Chancellor’s Conversation with President Yeltsin on 19 February 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on 19 February 1996 in Moscow (16.45 - 17.30 hours)

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the President of the Polish Republic, Mister Alexander Kwasniewski on 9 January 1996 at the Chancellor’s Office

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Iran’s President Rafsanjani on 2 October 1995 at 16.25 hours

Memorandum to All Missions by the Department of External Affairs, ‘Arms Control’ (Confidential) (408/264B), Dublin

Dáil Éireann Debate, Tuesday 7 July 1959, Committee on Finance - Vote 59--External Affairs [Excerpt]

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin)

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin) (Private and Confidential), New York

Press Release containing a Speech by Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken and Draft Resolutions on Nuclear Disarmament

Address by Mr. Frank Aiken to the United Nations General Assembly Official, 23th Session, 751st Plenary Meeting

Confidential Report from Thomas J. Kieran (Ottawa) to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Poland and our Policy at U.N.O.’

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Croatia’s President Tudjman on 25 August 1995 at 09.20 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 18 August 1995, 13.00 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin on 20 July at 12.00 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Yugoslavia Mediator Carl Bildt on 20 July 1995, 12.45 hours

Memorandum: Situation in former Yugoslavia, here: The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 17 July 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on 9 May 1995 in Moscow

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Polish President Walesa in Copenhagen on 11 March 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with King Hussein Bin Talal of Jordan on 29 August 1994 at the Chancellor’s Office, 16.30 hours until 17.50 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, on 4 July 1994 from 9.55 to 11.05 a.m. at the Federal Chancellery

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati on 13 June 1994 at the Chancellor’s Office

Memorandum: President Yeltsin's Visit in Bonn, here: Delegation Meeting on 11 May at the Chancellor’s Office

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Iran's President Rafsanjani on 6 May, 13.30 - 13.43 hours

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran's Vice Foreign Minister Vaezi on 25 February 1994 at the Chancellor's Office

Meeting between Head of Department 2 [Joachim Bitterlich] and Iranian Ambassador Mousavian on 17 February 1994

Cable, Secretary of State to US Office Berlin (Eyes Only for Ambassador Holbrooke), 'Memcon of Clinton-Kohl January 31 Lunch'

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Lunch Meeting with President Clinton in Washington on 31 January 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 18 January 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin on 29 September 1993 at 8.30 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 7 September 1993

Cable, Richard Armitage to the White House for Mr. Robert Gates, 'Hussein/Armitage Meeting January 21, 1991'

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on 11 May 1993 17.30-17.40 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with ANC Chairman Nelson Mandela on Monday, 10 May 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Christopher on Thursday, 6 May 1993

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with the Chairman of Iran's Foreign Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee and Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Mister Hassan Rouhani, on 29 April 1993 in Bonn

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin on 29 April 1993 at 15.00 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Czech President Havel on Montag, 26 April 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 19 April, 13.45-13.55 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak in Bonn on 30 March 1993, 15.30-17.20 hours

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. President Clinton on Friday, 26 March 1993 in Washington

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Thursday, 18 March 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 15 March 1993

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