Skip to content

Results:

1 - 50 of 3254

Documents

May 12, 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev on Saturday, 10 May 1997, 2.30 p.m. - 3.45 p.m. in Almaty

Kohl and Nazarbaev dissus a variety of issues including Russia, China, NATO enlargement and the domestic situation in Iran against the backdrop of the end of Rafsandjani's tenure in 1997. Kohl reiterates his willingness to engage Iran. At the same time, he stresses the need for Iran to move first in order to show goodwill.

April 23, 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin on 17 April 1997 in Baden-Baden

Kohl and Yeltsin talk about the convocation of regular German-Russian summits including their relevant ministers. They review Yeltsin's meeting with Clinton in Helsinki on NATO enlargmement in March 1997 when Yeltsin gave his consent to the conclusion of a NATO-Russia partnership treaty based on the condition that NATO would not deploy nuclear armaments and permanent conventional forces in its new member states. Kohl points to the long-term perspective and the importance of concluding the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

July 5, 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, on 4 July 1994 from 9.55 to 11.05 a.m. at the Federal Chancellery

Kohl and Li Peng discuss human rights in China and the Chinese interpretation of the Tiananmen   Square protests and massacre of 1989. Moreover, they review the relationship between the Vatican and China, German policy on Taiwan, China and  GATT, China and the USA as well as EC trade restrictions vis-à-vis China.

March 3, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Indonesian President Suharto on Wednesday, 24 February 1993

Kohl and Suharto discuss questions of Indonesia's internatioal role, the situation in South East Asia and trade with Germany. Suharto underlines his efforts to work for Indonesia’s movement toward the position of the G-7. Moreover, Kohl and Suharto discuss the sale of former East German navy ships for Indonesia.

February 20, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Rao on Thursday, 18 February 1993

Kohl and Rao discuss the state of German-Indian relations, especially in terms of trade. Rao complains about problems with regards to the import of dual-use goods from Germany. India's feelings were hurt as the country was treaty in the same way as Libya. Kohl makes a case for caution saying that "Germany must not become the global arms exporter number one.“

February 26, 1971

From the Journal of M.G. Podol’sky, 'Record of a Conversation with R. Berthold, Counsellor of the GDR Embassy in Hanoi, 18 February 1971'

A Soviet official in Vietnam recounts a meeting with an East German diplomat. The two sides discussed the nuclear threats from the United States in the Vietnam War, as well as relations with China.

June 3, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Situation in China (Student Demonstrations)'

The document from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals Japanese Embassy personnel observations of the events that took place in Xinjuamen and Xidan on the afternoon of June 3, 1989 following the Tiananmen Square incident. It also references Premier Li Peng and Defense Minister Qin Jeiwei’s response following the events.

June 20, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Chinese Student Movement (After Armed Suppression by the Military)'

Report from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the subsequent actions of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada.

June 3, 1989

Television News in Beijing at 7 o'clock in the Evening, June 3

Summary of the announcements of martial law in Beijing.

June 4, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'Use of Force by Chinese Martial Law Forces (Questions and Answers)'

Report from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 4, 1989 detailing Japan’s response to the use of force by Chinese martial law forces following the Tiananmen Square incident.

June 4, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Chinese Student Demonstrations (Part 2)'

The document, written on June 4, 1989 and submitted by the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan, lists the facts surrounding Beijing’s use of martial law authorities and military force during the Tiananmen Square incident on June 3, 1989. It details the background leading up to the imposition of the martial law, power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party, lateness in bringing the situation under control, and struggle for democratization and liberalization. It also indicates the impact of the Tiananmen Square incident and the CCP’s response as it pertains to the Party’s prestige and international image.

June 11, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Situation in China (Moves to Bring the Situation Under Control)'

Written on June 11, 1989, by Japan’s China Division, this document summarizes the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the Tiananmen Square incident. It evaluates the CCP’s apparent change in party leadership, problems in domestic affairs, problems in promoting reform and opening, and effect on external relations.

June 21, 1989

Document for the Vice Minister from the Aid Policy Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau

The document was written on June 21, 1989 by the Aid Policy Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau for the Vice Minister of Japan. The document focuses on how to respond to the Tiananmen Square incident and China’s means to which it modernizes and opens its economy. It urges the continuing of ongoing projects and eventual resumption of new economic projects in China once the situation stabilizes and dissuades from any substantial change in Japan’s economic policy towards China.

September 1989

Cable No. 2720, Ambassador Nakajima to the Foreign Minister, 'Japan-China Relations (Opinion Statement)'

An opinion statement on Japan-China relations sent by Ambassador Nakajima to the Foreign Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan details Japan’s concerns over the Chinese government’s actions during the Tiananmen Square incident. Ambassador Nakajima provides an assessment of China’s response to foreign government’s sanctions, expresses uncertainty on future political developments in China, and provides policy prescriptions on Japan’s policy towards China going forward.

June 12, 1989

China Division [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'Our Country’s Future China Policy (Taking the Situation into Account)'

Outline of Japan’s basic understanding of the situation in China in regards to the Tiananmen Square incident. The document discusses the ongoing approach to China, issues requiring specific examination, Japan-China bilateral economic relations, international diplomatic aspects, and points of consideration for future policy discussions.

June 1989

The Situation in China – Main Points of Minister’s Remarks at Japan – United States Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

Highlights Japan’s ongoing understanding of the situation in China following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Japan’s China policy, implications of U.S.-China relations to Japan, future China policy, and an explanation regarding Japan’s future economic cooperation with China.

June 1989

The Situation in China – Main Points of Minister’s Remarks at Japan-United States Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

Main points of Japanese Minister’s remarks that took place at Japan-United States Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the situation in China following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. It answers key questions on Japan’s policy towards China on diplomacy and economic cooperation along with implications of a deterioration in U.S.-China relations following Tiananmen Square.

2003

Tran Quang Co: A Memoir

The memoir of Trần Quang Cơ (1927-2015), former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), brings to light the intense diplomacy among great powers and regional players over the continued conflicts in Indochina after the unification of Vietnam as well as the bitter disagreements within the Vietnamese leadership over the country’s political priorities during the period of 1975-1993.

Cơ put together his memories and thoughts on “many sensitive developments” in Vietnamese foreign relations that he believed had been “intentionally or unintentionally” forgotten (rơi rụng) in the state-endorsed history “to ‘smooth over’ (tròn trĩnh) the historical record.”  Completed in Vietnamese in 2001 (updated in 2003) and informally circulated on the internet, Merle Pribbenow’s English-translation makes this valuable historical source available to wider audiences.

October 10, 1963

John McCone (Director of Central Intelligence Agency) to Mexico City, 'Chinese in Mexico of Operational Interest'

The CIA director reports that the Agency is in control of Liang Sicheng’s brother in the US and is using him to arrange a meeting between the two men in Mexico City, in which Liang Sicheng's defection would be raised as a real possibility.

October 12, 1963

John McCone (Director of Central Intelligence Agency) to Mexico City, 'Cable: Background on CCP Member Born 1901'

A cable sent from CIA headquarters to an agency officer in Mexico City concerning Liang Sicheng and whether or not he could be persuaded to defect to the United States. Though Liang's name was not disclosed during the declassification process, the identifying details match Liang's biography.

November 1963

Chinese Communist Industrial Trade Fair Scheduled to Be Held in Mexico City December 1963

An "information report" from a CIA officer in Mexico City concerning the possible opening of an Chinese Communist industrial trade fair.

May 4, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in Bonn, 30 April 1992, 11:45 – 12:10 Hours

Kohl and Miyazawa talk about financial aid for Russia and preparations for the 1992 World Economic Summit as well as Kohl's request for additional Japanese economic support for Russia. In contrast, Miyazawa highlights the importance of the unresolved territorial question over the Kuriles.

March 27, 1952

National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952'

The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.

March 16, 1955

National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan'

The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.

March 11, 1964

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-64, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China'

The CIA assesses Taiwan's future in the wake of France's normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The report covers US-Republic of China relations and likely developments in Taiwan's internal security, politics, and international recognition.

June 20, 1961

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-61, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate about the future of the Republic of China assesses the status of the China debate at the United Nations, KMT efforts to retake the mainland, the political status of local Taiwanese in the ROC, and other political and diplomatic issues.

February 4, 1957

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Planning for Possible Acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offers to be Vice Premier'

Analysts at the CIA assess whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to become a Vice Premier for the People's Republic of China, following Zhou Enlai's offer to that effect.

August 27, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."

April 9, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-57, 'Likelihood of Military Action by the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."

October 9, 1956

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

August 29, 1958

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Morale on the Major Offshore Islands and on Taiwan'

A report on the situation on Quemoy (Jinmen), Matsu (Mazu), and Taiwan and US support for the Republic of China (Taiwan).

September 10, 1954

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4/1-54: The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands off the Coast of Mainland China

A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.

July 7, 1977

Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China'

Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.

December 13, 1982

Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Bush and Pakistani President Zia, December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m.

Bush and Zia discuss the Soviet war in Afghanistan, China's relations with Pakistan and the US, the status of Taiwan, and the Pakistani nuclear program.

January 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment'

The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle."

This document has been review and declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on at least two separate occasions. The above version was approved for release on January 20, 2010. An alternative version, with different material withheld, was approved for release on May 12, 2011.

September 5, 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'China's Active Diplomacy in Latin America'

The CIA anticipates diplomatic victories for the PRC in Latin America as more countries will switch recognition away from Taiwan.

This version of the report was declassified on October 5, 2010. The CIA declassified the same report again on June 30, 2011. Each version has different sections that were withheld from public release. Both versions of the report should be consulted by readers.

March 17, 1983

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'China and the Asian Development Bank'

A report on China's request for membership in the Asian Development Bank and its demand for Taiwan's expulsion from the ADB.

March 19, 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Chinese Tactics and Motives in Dealing with the US'

The CIA assesses that the Chinese leadership is taking a more confrontational stance in order to win concessions from the United States vis-à-vis Taiwan.

July 7, 1977

Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China'

Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.

August 27, 1957

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China (Advance Conclusions)'

A CIA estimate of the strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, with particular reference to its staying power. The declassified portion of this report includes only the report's summary and conclusions.

September 4, 1954

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-54: The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands off the Coast of Mainland China

A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.

September 10, 1954

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4/1-54: The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands off the Coast of Mainland China

A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.

April 1984

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Briefing Material for the President's Trip to China'

Includes memoranda on "China's Independent Foreign Policy in Perspective," "The Foreign Policy Positions of China's Senior Leaders," "Deng-Zhao with Brzezinski--An Assessment," "Sino-Soviet Relations," "China and a Korean Dialogue," "Sino-Soviet Trade and Economic Relations," "China and Japan: Building for the Long Haul," "China's Taiwan Policy," "China-Southeast Asia," "China: Leadership and Succession," "China: Economic Reforms," "US-China Economic Relations," "China: Expanding Market for US Energy Firms," "China: Nuclear Power Prospects," and "China: Changes in Military Industrial Development Policy-Implications for the United States."

September 5, 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'China's Active Diplomacy in Latin America'

The CIA anticipates diplomatic victories for the PRC in Latin America as more countries will switch recognition away from Taiwan.

This version of the report was declassified on June 30, 2011. The CIA had earlier declassified a copy of the same report on October 5, 2010. Each version has different sections that were withheld from public release. Both versions of the report should be consulted by readers.

December 10, 1981

Memorandum: China-Taiwan Trade

A report on the present status and future prospects of the still "economically insignificant" trade between Taiwan and the PRC.

September 1999

National Intelligence Estimate: China-Taiwan: Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations

This NIE discusses how relations between China and Taiwan will develop in the three year period from 2000 until 2002.

September 1999

National Intelligence Estimate: China-Taiwan: Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations

This NIE discusses how relations between China and Taiwan will develop in the three year period from 2000 until 2002.

October 5, 1989

Memorandum from J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft, H. Lawrence Sandall, and George P. Cole, Jr., 'Taiwan Guidelines'

J. Stapleton Roy offers a prime on US policy toward Taiwan and how US government agencies should interact with Taiwan's Coordination Council for North American Affairs or with other Taiwanese authorities.

January 18, 1986

Cable from AIT Taipei to the AIT Washington, DC, 'Full Transcription of CODEL Hatch's Press Conference in Taipei'

The American Institute in Taiwan reports on the visit of a 16-member Congressional delegation led by Senator Orrin Hatch.

Pagination