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South Asia

Afghanistan

Afghan resistance fighters return to a village destroyed by Soviet forces

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

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Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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United States

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

Andrei Gromyko at the UN, 1981

Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich

1909- 1989

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East Asia

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South Asia

Pakistan

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Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich

1914- 1984

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Najibullah, Mohammad

1947- 1996

Leonid Brezhnev, 1974.

Brezhnev, Leonid Il'ich

1906- 1982

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Ustinov, Dimitri F.

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Sino-Soviet Relations

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

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Middle East

Pakistani Nuclear History

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Sino-Soviet Rapprochement, 1985-1989

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November 8, 1982	'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.
June 17, 1982	Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government
August 20, 1981	Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation' In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
January 31, 1980	Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith, enclosing excerpts from memoranda of conversations with Geng Biao and Deng Xiaoping. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had an immediate impact on U.S. policy toward Pakistan and U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet resistance through Islamabad. With these considerations, the U.S. chose to “set [the nuclear issue] aside for the time being.”
April 2004	KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82 Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.
August 11, 1979	Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin in which Amin again asks for Soviet troops to help boost the morale of the people of Afghanistan
December 31, 1979	Report on the Situation in Afghanistan, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to CPSU CC, 27-28 December 1979 Andropov Gromyko Ustinov Ponomarev Report on Events in Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979 regarding the crisis in Afghanistan and the overthrow of Amin’s oppressive regime with the help of Soviet troops
April 1, 1979	Memo on Protocol #149 of the Politburo, "Our future policy in connection with the situation in Afghanistan" The following CPSU Central Committee document, dated 1 April 1979 and signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov, and CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev, provides a strikingly candid assessment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan that the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring 1979. The report attributes the increasing success of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the Afghan Mujaheddin) to the “miscalculations and mistakes” of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime that seized power following the April 1978 “revolution.”
August 5, 1989	CPSU CC Memo with excerpt of Politburo Protocol #164, 5 August 1989 On the provision of additional war supplies to Afghanistan.
December 27, 1979	CPSU CC Memo with attachments, 27 December 1979, on Politburo Protocol #177 The memo concerns Soviet steps on ties with the development of the situation around Afghanistan.