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Documents

July 1, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 501869, Razuvaev to Shtemenko

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shtemenko requesting orders and advice for Kim Il Sung on the imminent armistice talks and the terms to be adopted there.

July 2, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 101529, Filippov [Stalin] to Cde. Razuvaev

Message from Stalin that the Koreans must talk with the Chinese about armistice negotiations.

January 30, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 100269, Feng Xi [Stalin] to Comrade Razuvaev

Telegram instructing Ambassador Razuvaev to discuss with Kim Il Sung details for reorganizing the KPA administrative and command structure.

February 4, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 500361, Razuvaev to Cde. Feng Xi [Stalin]

Telegram from Amb. Rauvaev to Stalin reporting on the changes planned in the structure of the KPA, per Stalin's telegram of 30 January

February 3, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 100319, Feng Xi [Stalin] to Razuvaev

Stalin clarifies that his previous telegram of 30 January was not an order, but a proposal to discuss options with Korea.

May 29, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 101255, Filippov [Stalin] to Cde. Razuvaev

Stalin sends a message for Kim Il Sung saying that he cannot give Kim Il Sung rifle-mortar arms, but can give him other types of ammunition.

April 18, 1953

Explanatory Note from Lt. Gen. V.N. Razuvaev to L.P. Beria

Razuvaev explains the steps taken to make it appear that Americans are using biological weapons in the Korean War. China initially sent reports of such weaponry, and soon after Korea, led by Soviet advisors, joined in the falsification of biological attacks by creating false plague regions with the help of the Korean Ministry of Health. After visits from two international delegations, Korea eventually abandoned its plan to falsely accuse America, while China continued to advance the story.

September 27, 1950

Telegram from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) and T.F. Shtykov

Stalin blames the recent success of the UN forces in Seoul on the inefficiency of the KPA’s Frontline Command and Soviet military advisors, as well erroneous use of tank tactics and overall combat strategy. Stalin provides a detailed list instructing military advisors, and especially Vasilyev, how to delpoy and manage Korean troops around Seoul.

September 27, 1950

Telegram from Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) to Stalin

Matveyev describes the state of the Korean People’s Army, particularly the severe status of troops in Seoul and Busan after having encountered American air and ground forces. Matveyev also reports on a meeting between several Soviet and Korean foreign ministers in which Kim Il Sung assumed the tasks of both Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister and ordered the deployment of troops northward. Matveyev also outlines the steps he plans to take as a Soviet envoy in aiding the desperate Korean army.

September 30, 1950

Draft Telegram from Chanfu (Bulganin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev)

A response to Matveyev’s previous telegram approving the consolidation of power (as Supreme Commander in Chief and Defense Minister) to Kim Il Sung, the formation of six divisions, transport of ammunitions and fuel. Bulganin also unofficially advocates Kim’s plans to request aid from China.

Pagination