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November 16, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 9 p.m., Friday

A report from Roberto de Oliveira Campos on how certain actions and diplomatic moves during the Cuban crisis have served to inflame international tensions on both sides.

November 19, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow (da Cunha), 6 p.m., Monday

Da Cunha reports that the Soviet press (and government) has hidden from its readers the recent evolution of the Cuban problem/crisis.

November 16, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:30 p.m., Friday

Pinto discusses the current situation in Cuba and feels certain that Cuba depends more and more on Soviet economic help, but that Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications.

November 14, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 3:15 p.m., Wednesday

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

November 10, 1962

Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

November 12, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday

A description of how the American blockade against Cuba has hurt its production, shipping and foreign commerce capabilities. And according to this telegram, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.

November 9, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 7:45 p.m., Friday

Pinto describes his conversation with the Cuban Minister of External Relations, Raúl Roa, which he says confirmed his impressions that the Cuban government, conscious of the gravity of the situation, is disposed to make concessions to reach a minimal guarantee.

November 9, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 a.m., Friday

Pinto meets with Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro to discuss Brazilian-Soviet-Cuban relations.

November 9, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York, 7:30 p.m., Friday

Mello-Franco discusses a conversation he had with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov. According to Kuznetsov, the American insistence on the question of inspection is becoming moot [ociosa] since the United States has declared satisfaction with the removal of offensive material existing in Cuba, it is only a pretext to postpone indefinitely the commitment of non-invasion and suspension of the economic blockade against Cuba.

November 6, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 10:30 a.m., Tuesday

Pinto calls to attention the rude and violent tone of the proclamations of support to Cuba on the part of China contrasting with the relative moderation of the USSR and of its satellites. Pinto believes Mao is "taking a shot" at Khrushchev.

Pagination