The document highlights the possibilities and advantages of a nuclear cooperation agreement between Buenos Aires and Brasília, particularly after the dispute over the Itaipu dam and the visit of the president of CNEA, Castro Madero, to Brazil. In the last two pages of the document, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, João Clemente Baena Soares, Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro and President Figueiredo react positively and they agree to invite Admiral Castro Madero to visit Brazil and to deepen the negotiations on nuclear cooperation.

Cyrus Vance - apparently unintentionally - left behind this document while meeting with Brazilian President Geisel. It lays out US negotiations with Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco, to accept full scope safeguards and to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility in exchange for US nuclear assistance and Brazil’s acceptance of a moratorium on the construction of a reprocessing facility.

According to a US document left behind by Cyrus Vance, Argentina had agreed to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco, to accept full scope safeguards and to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility in exchange for US nuclear assistance and Brazil’s acceptance of a moratorium on the construction of a reprocessing facility. Commenting the paper, Foreign Minister Silveira defines US strategy as “irresponsible” and considers it as an encouragement to the rivalry and confrontation between Argentina and Brazil.

Abreu reports a conversation in which ambassador Camillión revealed President Videla’s desire to visit Brazil, implying that Itaipu was a sensitive issue, but of domestic nature. The Argentine government suggested a joint declaration on nuclear issues to turn away international suspicions on "the production of the bomb."

Meeting among the members of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Energy, the National Commission of Atomic Energy and the Council of National Security on a nuclear cooperation agreement proposed by CNEA. The objective of the agreement was to steer away doubts about a hypothetical nuclear competition between Brazil and Argentina, after Jimmy Carter was elected president in the US. Most participants of the meeting were contrary to a nuclear cooperation with Buenos Aires.

Quihillalt suggests to the new Argentine foreign minister, Juan B. Martin, the formalization of the nuclear relationship with Brazil through the signature of a memorandum of understanding.

The document highlights that the export of Argentine uranium to Brazil will be a difficult operation due to diplomatic hurdles.

This document reports on CNEA’s position on the exports of uranium to Brazil and reports that the operation will not produce any economic benefit. Nevertheless, it is favorable to the export as a token of Argentina’s good will in regard to nuclear cooperation with Brazil.

A Brazilian diplomat to Argentina expresses an interest in acquiring five tons of uranium free from safeguards to Argentine authorities. CNEA and the foreign ministry of Argentina approved the request, taking into consideration the favorable diplomatic relations between the two countries at the moment.

Ribeiro conveys the Brazilian interest in establishing a nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina, expressed during the visit of the Brazilian mission to the inauguration of Ezeiza Atomic facility in Buenos Aires in 1967.