McLaren wonders why the West Germans want safeguard-free uranium from the Argentine government, noting that it could be re-exported to Israel. He also confirms that information about the Argentine-Israeli deal had been passed to the Americans.

After consulting the Defense Intelligence Staff, Goodison writes to Kellas that "we must now accept the end of 1968 as the earliest possible date" for an Israeli nuclear bomb. As the Canadian report suggested an Israeli test by 1966, either 1968 was a typo or the Defense Intelligence Staff provided more detailed comments than are available in the file.

In this letter, which summarizes and agrees with the US assessment of the Argentine-Israeli deal, Arkell asks for Goodison's opinion and whether he knows of any safeguards arrangements between Israel and Argentina.

Referring to Goodison and Kellas' correspondence, Treweeks states that evidence shows that the Canadian report concerning an Argentine-Israeli uranium deal was incorrect and that there is little evidence for an Israeli plutonium separation facility.

Alan Goodison reported that U.S. officials were skeptical of the Canadian report because their sources had no information about an Argentine-Israeli deal and Argentine exports to Israel had not been reported in the Official Bulletin.

In response to Alan Goodison's April 29 letter, which referred to evidence for an Israeli plutonium separation facility, Arthur Kellas, counselor to the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, states that the British Embassy had “not seen such evidence [for a separation facility] and should be grateful to know what it is."

According to D. Arkell of the Defence Intelligence Staff, Canadian intelligence was now doubtful about the reliability of their reports on the Argentine-Israeli uranium sale.

Noting some inaccuracy in the Canadian Defence Research Board report---Argentina could not have offered to sell its “entire production” of uranium if it was also selling concentrate to Germany and trying to sell it to Japan—Goodison, of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department, asked Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to “keep your ears to the ground” to find the “exact quantities” involved.

Christopher Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, learned from the Canadian Charge d'Affaires that the information on the Argentine-Israel uranium deal "did not originate in Buenos Aires," and that the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission had made previous uranium sales to West Germany and to Israel in 1962. Minutes are attached.

In a letter to Arthur Kellas, counselor at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, Alan Goodison of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department disclosed the Argentine-Israel uranium deal, which involved the transfer of 80-100 tons over 33 months. Since evidence suggested that Israel had facilities for plutonium separation, they estimated that there would be enough plutonium for a weapon within 20 months; however, Goodison had no proof that the Israelis planned to produce a nuclear weapon, only that they had the capability to do so. Minutes are attached.