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May 9, 1987

Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'General Rogers' position on US-USSR negotiations for nuclear arms control (LRINF and SRINF)'

Telegram from Italy's permanent representative to NATO re-caps the controversial position presented by the Supreme Allied Commander Rogers. General Rogers criticizes the Reagan administration's strategy and expresses concern over the disparity between NATO capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact.

October 24, 1945

Memorandum of a Conversation between W.A. Harriman and Stalin

W.A. Harriman and Stalin discuss post-war peace treaties and discuss who will be invited to participate in negotiations in the European war.

May 28, 1983

CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (2)

The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

May 28, 1983

CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (1)

The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

October 14, 1983

Telex from the East German Embassy in Romania to Bucharest, 14 October 1983

Summary of Romanian position on the Euromissiles Crisis presented at October 1983 summit and also shared with the United States via a letter from Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Ronald Reagan.The Ceauşescu – Reagan letter underscored that: (1) Romania did not approve of the Soviet missile deployments; (2) noted that Romania would only participate in defense operations, and specified that it would carefully consider the nature of the call for assistance by fellow alliance members before sending its troops outside of Romanian territory; (3) stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces were fully under national control, giving several specific details on how this was guaranteed; and (4) explicitly noted that Romania did not and would not ever host nuclear missiles on its territory, whether from the Soviet Union or the United States.

February 22, 1946

George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'

George F. Kennan writes to the Secretary of State with a lengthy analysis of Soviet policy in an attempt to explain their recent uncooperative behavior. This message would later become famous as the "long telegram."

August 9, 1968

Cipher Telegram 2961-2330, To the commanding general of the 2nd Army of the Polish Armed Forces, copy to the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Division General Cde. B. Chocha.

The Soviet exercise control staff provides the Polish forces with information regarding the upcoming joint military exercise.

July 28, 1968

Cipher Telegram 2791-337/8, To the Commanding General of the Silesian Military District, copy to the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

The Soviet exercise control staff provides the Polish forces from the Silesian region with directions regarding the forthcoming military exercise. The Polish troops are ordered to maintain secrecy so as to avoid enemy intelligence gathering.

1985

Report of a Representative of the USSR Chief of Armed Forces Communications, Developing Modern Communication Systems

This report summarizes findings and recommendations by the leadership of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact on the issue of improving allied communications systems and equipment. The writer warns that the alliance's communications technology has not kept up with the demands of modern military command and control systems, emphasizing the importance of rapid combat readiness and survivability; the complexity of modern technical systems and equipment; the imperative of maintaining secrecy; and the significance of efficient transmission of information. By integrating advanced technologies within the existing military infrastructure, it is argued, the Warsaw Pact forces will be better equipped to meet these challenges. Suggestions include standardizing equipment across the military, adopting digital formats of information, automating communications, developing technologies immune to the environmental consequences of nuclear explosions, and more.

March 11, 1953

Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council

The US National Security Council discusses the effect that Stalin’s death had on Soviet policy and on Communist Parties outside of the USSR, as well as the opportunity it provided the US to use Stalin’s death in a psychological strategy to influence the Soviets. The Council also discusses the possibility of negotiations for a settlement with the Soviets in Korea.

Pagination