Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani’s visit to the U.S. was an opportunity for he and President Kennedy to reach “a meeting of the minds” on the Jupiter-Polaris problem. The two had several conversations during the next two days on East-West relations, NATO nuclear issues, and the developing world, among other topics.  During this conversation, with only the U.S. translator present, Kennedy explained to Fanfani that Polaris/Sergeant missiles as a replacement for Jupiter/Corporals, along with Italian participation in an eventual MLF, should be announced as “whole package” rather than to have “the different points of decision simply leak out, without coherence and possibly at the wrong moment.” He believed that the main elements of the agreement would find “general approval” among most political groupings in Italy. When Fanfani brought up the possibility of announcing the U.S. request on Jupiters and Polaris and then taking it to his government, Kennedy emphasized the need for quick action, adding that it would “not be desirable to allow for prolonged discussion” of the package.

At Fanfani’s request, Kennedy explained the arrangements for Polaris missions in the Mediterranean, which operated out of a base in the Iberian Peninsula (Rota, Spain), and the various options for an MLF, either surface or submarine ships. Such an approach, Kennedy believed, was a way to improve the “position of the West.” Accepting Kennedy’s assertions about the dangers of the Jupiter missiles, Fanfani nevertheless saw a “psychological” problem involving the “prestige and strength” of Italy’s armed forces. Kennedy “indicated lively interest” in Fanfani’s question as to whether the Jupiter bases could be used for “cooperative peaceful space efforts.”

At the meeting’s conclusion, Kennedy “stressed that by the following morning they should be able to combine four or five points into a proposal that would strengthen the Italian and American position within the framework of the Alliance, thus making this meeting a gain in its cohesiveness and hence political strength.”

On October 26, 1962, as the Cuban Missile Crisis is unfolding, U.S. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt replied to a State Department inquiry about possible Italian reactions to withdrawal of the Jupiters, stating that they “would probably be manageable,” but also recommending early consultations with the Italian government if they were to “form part of negotiated settlement.” In particular, Reinhardt suggested offsetting the withdrawal with gestures to appeal to the Italian government’s craving for status, such as (a) presenting the removal as an Italian contribution to the relaxation of East-West tensions, (b) some kind of “big power consultation” between the U.S. and Italy, coupled with assurances on “the presence of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean,” (c) “public emphasis on Italy’s role in NATO in order to counter-balance loss of value which missiles have for Italy in calling attention to its role and position in alliance,” and (d) a promise to halt further reductions of U.S. military commitments in Italy. In short, Reinhardt saw a phase-out as a possibility but something to be “be very carefully handled.”

An analysis of the Reykjavik Summit touches on the impetus of the two parties, the outcome of the negotiations, and their possible implications for Italy.

This document summarizes Ambassador Nitze's speech on the issue of security and disarmament, and provides a rather detailed description of current U.S. position vis-à-vis the USSR in the field of disarmament and global security.

A comprehensive analysis of the Soviet position in the upcoming disarmament negotiations regarding SDI, FNI, MBFR, and chemical weapons. Overall, there seems to be increased willingness on the Soviet side to free up economic resources from military sector.

Analysis by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Reagan's (May 26, 1986) letter to PM Craxi. It discusses intended American responses to Soviet violation of SALT II treaty, and calls for consultations with NATO member states.

Unofficial translation of correspondence between PM Craxi and President Reagan regarding strategic arms limitations and deterrence. Reagan outlines the planned US measures given lack of effort and willingness by the USSR to arrive to a binding agreement.

The document describes the state of the SNF negotiations that Italy and West Germany started pushing for in 1989.

The US permanent representative to NATO, Alton Keel, sends his Italian counterpart Fulci two brief documents about NATO's short-range nuclear forces.

Summary of the informal session of the High-Level Task Force seminar on Conventional Arms Control.