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Documents

October 11, 1958

File Note of Department IV Director Łobodycz

Polish Department IV director reports on the opinion of Pitterman, the deputy chancellor of Austria, on the Rapacki Plan. Pittermann recognizes the moral significance of the plan, but finds Hungary's inclusion to be paramount.

October 10, 1958

Correspondence Digest No. 12722 from Rome to Comrade Ogrodziński

The secretary of state of the Austrian Ministory of Foreign Affairs, Kriesky, shares his opinions about the Rapacki Plan. He proposes certain elements, such as extending the nuclear-free zone to include the Scandinavian countries, and the establishment of a control body made up of representatives of the zone member states.

February 24, 1958

Code Message No. 2401 from Chargé d'Affaires Jurysiowa in Vienna to Łobodycz

The Polish chargé d’affaires in Vienna discusses Austrian reactions of officials and the press to the Rapacki Plan.

July 18, 1990

Johann Plattner, Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'German Unity; State of Affairs in mid-July 1990'

The report assesses German unity in three parts. The first regards internal factors of integration such as integrating monetary systems and elections. The next portion regards external factors, focusing mainly on the USSR's parameters for reunification regarding NATO and Poland's western border. Finally, the report assesses German reunification and predicts the process will be complete by the end of the year (1990). In addition, it discusses the positive prospects for European Unity and emphasizes Austria's role in binding a newly united Germany to Western Europe.

November 24, 1989

Information by the East German Office of National Security on the Austrian Assessment of the Situation in the GDR and the Development of Austrian–East German Relations, Berlin (East)

The document recounts the discussion between party officials from Austria's People's Party and Socialist Party in regards to changing developments in East and West Germany. Based on historical, political, and economic precedent, the overwhelming sentiment is against reunification. However, due to the rapidness of political events in the GDR the Socialist Party had yet to decide how to react. The parties then outline a plan to establish connections from both East and West German leadership as well as resistance movements in Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia.