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November 9, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 9 November 1962

Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

July 1, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39

Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.

November 10, 1962

Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials

Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

October 27, 1962

Soviet Intelligence Report on Meeting with Scali and American Proposal

Report on the exchanges between the KGB Station Chief in Washington and ABC News correspondent John Scali. They discuss possible Soviet actions in West Berlin in the case of an American invasion of Cuba and an American offer not to invade Cuba if Fidel Castro publicly pledges to dismantle the long-range missiles. Washington would agree to let Cuba keep the defensive-type missiles and might make a secret pledge to withdraw the American troops in the South.