Ambassador Pervukhin sends the views of the Soviet embassy in East Germany regarding the negotiation of a peace treaty between East Germany and the Soviet Union. It notes that "the most difficult issues which will arise after signing a peace treaty are the practical exercise by [the] GDR organs of effective control over the links between West Berlin and the FRG and the establishment of a regime over the movement of the population between West and Democratic Berlin."

Ambassador Pervukhin reports to Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko on the position of the East German government regarding the possibility of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany and a resolution to the ambiguous status of Berlin. The report also discusses the possibility of enforcing better border controls between east and west Berlin in order to "close 'the door to the West.'"

CIA Memorandum for President Truman on US position on Soviet actions in Berlin.

Summarizes Soviet objectives and strategies in entering into Four-Power discussions about Berlin and Germany.

Describes effect of Soviet restrictive measures in Berlin on US intelligence and propaganda activities and on operations of the joint military government.

Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.

Selected excerpts from Khrushchev's concluding speech at a conference of Warsaw Pact leader, focused on the building crisis over the status of Berlin.

This memorandum of conversation between the Head of the Far East Department in the East German Foreign Ministry Liebermann and Chinese Ambassador Peng Guangwei refers to China's intention to establish diplomatic relations with West Berlin. The East German side stresses the fact that countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria also established diplomatic relations with West Berlin taking into considerations the conditions posed by the international law and that China should do the same.

This is a memorandum of a conversation between the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, Rodin, and the director of the West Berlin Press Office, Günter Struve, with regard to China's intention to establish a trade representation in West Berlin. Apart from stressing that by initiating diplomatic relations with West Berlin, China is not implicitly acknowledging the existing international agreements, Rodin makes clear that East Germany will not rescind the rules on obligatory currency exchange for citizens of Western states.